

Joint Publication 3-41



Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management



02 October 2006



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Environment**
 - **Covers Domestic Consequence Management**
 - **Covers Foreign Consequence Management**
 - **Discusses Planning Considerations and Training**
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Introduction

Joint forces conduct chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) under several different circumstances.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) can be conducted within three situations (or environments): Department of Defense (DOD) leads the operational response in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies, across the range of military operations; defense support to civil authorities in a domestic response. This response includes assisting Federal agencies within the US, territories, and possessions in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP); or, defense support to a foreign request. Tasks will originate from the host nation (HN) through the Department of State. The joint force commander (JFC) responsible for CBRNE CM focuses on mitigating the consequences of the CBRNE incident. Understanding the effects of CBRNE on the populace and the infrastructure is essential for the JFC to apply the right resources at the right time. Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational awareness with respect to the incident's cause to better understand the event's impact and to prevent further injury or harm to the civilian populace or the responding joint force. Situational awareness is especially important in suspected or known adversary attacks for force protection considerations.

Crisis Management, Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management and Foreign Consequence Management

Crisis management.

Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response and involves measures to identify, acquire, plan, and employ the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

Domestic CBRNE CM.

Domestic CBRNE CM are those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents.

Foreign consequence management.

Foreign consequence management (FCM) is defined as assistance provided by the United States Government (USG) to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and restore essential government services.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Overview

Addressing the impact of an accidental, intentional, or natural release of CBRNE material is the basis for the CBRNE CM activities performed by the Department of Defense.

CBRNE CM encompasses CM actions taken to address the consequences from all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear agents or substances, and high-yield explosives with potential to cause mass casualties and large levels of destruction. An exception is response to accidents or incidents involving US nuclear weapons in DOD or Department of Energy custody.

CBRNE CM, is normally managed at the national level (US or HN governments), with DOD providing support as directed. During combat operations, DOD leads the operational response in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies.

During a CBRNE incident, CM efforts must make the preservation of life a priority.

CBRNE consequences are the result of an accident or intentional incident involving chemical agents, biological agents, radiological sources, nuclear devices, or high-yield explosives, and/or industrial materials that are hazardous by themselves or when mixed with other material, including hazards from industrial pollutants and waste, and will produce a toxic effect in exposed personnel.

CBRNE CM includes those measures and methods of responding to CBRNE events to alleviate damage, loss of life, hardship or suffering caused by the incident, protect public health and safety, emergency restoration of essential government services and infrastructure, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE situation. The method of response will include use of standing contingency plans and procedures to determine what forces and capabilities are required and committed in support of requests for assistance.

Domestic Response Framework

Domestic CBRNE CM command and control.

The joint force conducting CBRNE CM will usually be in support of a Federal agency. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) always retains control of Federal (Title 10) military forces providing CBRNE CM. The state governors, through the adjutants general, control National Guard forces when those forces are performing active duty in their state role and when performing active duty under Title 32, United States Code. The JFC remains within the normal chain of command for military forces from the President, as Commander in Chief, to the SecDef, to the combatant commander (CCDR). If the JFC is a National Guardsman, the individual can maintain dual Title 10/Title 32 authority over forces, if agreed to by the President and the state governor.

The President, through his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions to include CBRNE CM response. To guide this response, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government issue and review key guidance, primarily through the President and Congress.

Key Executive Guidance

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents.

The NRP was developed as a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 to integrate the Federal Government current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards plan to unify the domestic incident management process. When the NRP is used, national interagency plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National Search and Rescue Plan, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and National Maritime Transportation Security Plan are incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans. In addition to consolidating Federal plans, other modifications within the NRP that impact DOD are the establishment of a National Operations Center (NOC), the establishment of an Interagency Advisory Council (IAC), and the creation of a principal Federal official, who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security at the incident site. A national incident management system (NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents was also a result of HSPD-5.

HSPD-8, National Preparedness.

This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident.

Domestic Consequence Management Special Considerations

Intelligence oversight collection and information sharing.

The judge advocate's role is especially important during domestic operations as the parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are overseas. Military commanders' need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on the rise — they expect force protection information and counterintelligence to be integrated into domestic operations due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering arena. DOD intelligence components are subject to one set of rules referred to as intelligence oversight.

Psychological operations.

US law and DOD policy prohibits DOD from using psychological operations (PSYOP) units to conduct operations against US citizens. However, these assets can be used to help disseminate critical information to the civilian population. DOD may use PSYOP personnel and equipment to support activities such as information dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting.

Use of weapons and rules for the use of force.

A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction establishes a presumption that units deployed to sites of a CBRNE situation will not carry arms. Units may deploy to sites of CBRNE situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently authorized to carry arms by the SecDef or is deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where weapons are authorized.

Immediate response.

The DOD policy on immediate response addresses the authority delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack. The potentially catastrophic nature of CBRNE incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces conducting CBRNE CM under immediate response authority, but there are no policy exceptions or special authorities for CBRNE CM.

Memorandums of understanding/memorandums of agreements.

Memorandums of understanding/memorandums of agreements for mutual assistance are often established between military installations and local communities. If an installation commander receives a request for assistance directly from local civil authorities prior to a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the requesting agency should be referred to the local/state emergency management channels, unless an immediate response condition exists or a mutual assistance agreement is in effect.

Plans for Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

The National Response Plan guides the Federal response to any given emergency or disaster.

The NRP uses the foundation provided by the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-5, and the Stafford Act to provide a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Most joint force domestic CBRNE CM operations will be authorized as a result of the President declaring a disaster or emergency.

National Incident Management System framework.

Joint forces performing CBRNE CM supporting civil authorities are part of domestic incident management and operate in accordance with the NRP. The NIMS forms the foundation for conducting domestic response operations. This framework provides a consistent approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Joint forces conduct CBRNE CM in accordance with NIMS but maintain a distinct, independent chain of command. However, military personnel can and frequently will receive tactical direction from the on-scene commander and subordinates, especially in circumstances where small numbers of military personnel augment civilian response functions. Installation forces operating under immediate response authority stay under the control of the Service branch of the chain of command unless committed to the Federal response effort by the Secretary of Defense. The NIMS is based on three levels: the field level, the regional level, and the national level. A joint force will interact within the framework of NIMS either directly with the defense coordinating officer or indirectly at all three levels.

At the national level, the IAC is comprised of senior Federal representatives from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, other Federal departments and agencies, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as required. The IAC plans and coordinates Federal strategic incident management efforts, to include assessing national impacts and those associated with the actual or proposed Federal response and anticipating future Federal resource and operational requirements for the incident. The NOC is the primary national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational awareness.

At the regional level, the regional response coordination center coordinates regional response efforts, establishes Federal priorities, and implements local Federal program support until a joint field office is established at the field level.

At the field level, the incident command structure (as detailed in the NRP) is used. The incident command is analogous to a tactical-level unit and directs on-scene emergency management.

Domestic Response Operations

Domestic response operations consist of the five phases.

Phase I—Alert/Preparation/Situation Assessment. Situational awareness is vital to understanding the CBRNE CM operation parameters.

Phase II — Deployment. Echeloning the needed joint force assets at the appropriate time is the key to success during this phase of the operation.

Phase III — Support to Civil Authorities. Planning and execution efforts will be synchronized with the efforts of the supported civil authorities.

Phase IV — Transition. Transition of functions to civil authorities begins when the civil authorities and the joint task force (JTF), as well as the supported combatant commander, agree to implement the transition plan.

Phase V — Redeployment. Redeployment begins when forces are directed to prepare for redeployment. Success is defined when all forces, less follow-on or remaining forces, have redeployed to their designated home station.

Foreign Consequence Management

Foreign consequence management (FCM) is assistance provided by the United States Government to a host nation to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and to restore essential government services.

Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed by the SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the CBRNE event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the effects of the CBRNE incident.

DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated efforts in response to requests from the LFA to support a HN. FCM may require specialized capabilities to include but not limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, urban search and rescue, public health and medical care, and public notification efforts beyond the scope or scale of traditional disaster relief efforts. Additionally, DOD will provide representation to the DOS-led foreign emergency support team/consequence management support team to support USG FCM operations, as requested by the DOS and directed by the SecDef. DOD will retain command and control of all DOD assets (personnel, infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG FCM operations.

Foreign Consequence Management Operations

FCM operations may require a complex and massive coordination effort.

USG and national agencies, allied nations' military and civilian agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs perform roles in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each entity might maintain a unique capability, coordination of responders is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains responsibility for coordination among USG entities.

FCM operations will generally not be conducted during hostile action; however, situations may arise where FCM may be required under less than permissive conditions at the request and support of the HN. For example, insurgents commit CBRNE incidents against a new

government. The new government may request response assistance from US and coalition forces. The USG may direct the US military to secure the area around the incident in order to establish the most permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response efforts.

Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations

Ongoing military operations take precedence over military support of FCM unless otherwise directed.

FCM plans should include support related to essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, CBRNE reconnaissance, public works, fire-fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential and/or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials mitigation, food preparation and distribution, and energy generation and distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require specialized hazard material handling, and decontamination planning efforts to enhance foreign disaster relief efforts.

Foreign Consequence Management Phases

FCM will be composed of five phases that will be scoped by tasks to be accomplished.

Phase I (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRNE situation, preparation for deployment and the deployment of selected advance elements.

Phase II (Deployment). Phase II begins with the SecDef approved Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment and/or execute order designating the intermediate and/or forward staging bases and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting commanders). The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II ends when all forces have completed movement to the designated incident location and supporting locations.

Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities). Phase III begins with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting locations and ends with the determination that DOD support is no longer required.

Phase IV (Transition to HN and/or Other Agencies). Although planning for transition of CBRNE CM begins as soon as practical following the initial response, Phase IV begins with the formal

implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by DOD.

Phase V (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the redeployment of US military forces involved in the foreign CM operations and is complete when all forces have returned to their previous military posture.

Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

Assess.

After a CBRNE incident, parallel assessment processes occur at the field level by local responders; at the regional level by the emergency response team-A; and at the national level by the NOC and IAC. These assessments determine the scope and magnitude of the incident, and will ultimately determine the need for DOD and joint force participation.

The CCDR will, in coordination with Federal and state authorities (usually the chief of mission (COM) or state adjutant general), send an assessment element to gain early situational awareness and conduct assessments in response to a CBRNE situation.

Coordinate operations.

Liaise and coordinate with other agencies and civil authorities. Interagency coordination is a continuous process that should be established and emphasized prior to an event occurring, as well as during and after an event happens. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR's joint interagency coordination group or other means such as an interagency planning cell or group at the combatant command or JTF levels, the importance of interagency coordination in the planning process cannot be overstated. In particular, ensure public affairs support, information management, and dissemination is in concert with that of DHS or the COM and HN.

Conduct logistics.

Providing logistic support for CBRNE CM produces challenges not encountered with other types of joint operations. There may be a high sense of urgency, especially if the US has been attacked. The force is task-organized depending on the mission and requires transportation, billeting, messing, and other life support services. The force may deploy with significant assets and specialized equipment that will be determined by the mission, situation, and the designated response force. The size of the force may range from a detachment to a brigade sized unit.

Health services support.

Frequently, the most immediate needs for support to civil authorities will be in the medical area. Providing initial essential stabilizing medical care and forward resuscitative/surgical care are the two essential capabilities that will be required in the first hours following the CBRNE event. DOD may also be required to support medical augmentation to local hospitals, community health (vaccinations, disease investigation, prophylaxis dispensing, preventive medicine and veterinary support), patient movement and distribution/redistribution of patients, medical logistics distribution, and mental health, as well as potentially providing direct medical treatment and patient decontamination.

Contain and decontaminate.

Tasks may include decontamination of civilian and military personnel as well as civilian and military equipment. Additionally, decontamination of contaminated remains is a viable mission. Local hospital decontamination tasks will also be required. Contaminated waste disposal will be a key requirement, and important in the context of interagency coordination. The Environmental Protection Agency will play a significant role as the emergency support function coordinator and primary agency responsible for hazardous waste.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management operations.

CHAPTER I

THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT

“You can’t improvise consequence management.”

Honorable Paul McHale
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
Visit to Joint Task Force Civil Support
29 October 2004

1. General

a. The focus of this publication is the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRNE with potential to cause high casualties and large levels of destruction. Joint forces conduct CBRNE CM under several different circumstances. CBRNE CM can be conducted within three situations (or environments):

(1) Department of Defense (DOD) leads the operational response in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies, across the range of military operations. This may also include response on a DOD installation.

(2) Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in a domestic response. This response includes assisting Federal agencies within the US, territories, and possessions in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP).

(3) Defense support to a foreign request. Tasks will originate from the host nation (HN) through the Department of State (DOS). However, on-scene DOD commanders may take appropriate action in life-threatening situations while awaiting DOD/DOS tasking.

b. The joint force commander (JFC) responsible for CBRNE CM focuses on mitigating the consequences of the CBRNE incident. Understanding the effects of CBRNE on the populace and the infrastructure is essential for the JFC to apply the right resources at the right time. Health effects on the populace may include asphyxiation, burns, radiation, shock, and blast injuries, as well as other complications from toxic industrial materials (TIMs), chemicals, biological agents, toxins and pathogens, and radiation. Infrastructure destruction may include damage to critical sectors that may disrupt the production and delivery of essential goods and services (e.g., water, public health and emergency services, energy, transportation, postal services), disrupt information and telecommunications technologies and operability, or degrade public safety and security. The infrastructure may be affected not only by a blast caused by high-yield explosives or a nuclear detonation, but also by contamination caused by chemicals, biological toxins and pathogens, radiation, or by toxic substances.

c. Due to the potentially catastrophic nature of a CBRNE incident, a joint force may be required to assist in the response after civilian resources have been overwhelmed or depleted.

Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational awareness with respect to the incident's cause to better understand the event's impact and to prevent further injury or harm to the civilian populace or the responding joint force. Situational awareness is especially important in suspected or known adversary attacks for force protection considerations. Analyzing the potential impact of a CBRNE incident on the population and associated infrastructure allows planners to adequately translate DOD capabilities into a coordinated response.

2. Crisis Management, Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management and Foreign Consequence Management

a. Crisis management (CrM) is predominantly a law enforcement response and involves measures to identify, acquire, plan, and employ the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

b. Domestic CBRNE CM are those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. CBRNE CM may include measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 establishes policy to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As such, the United States Government (USG) has a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management so that, with regard to domestic incidents, CrM and CBRNE CM are treated as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.

c. Foreign consequence management (FCM) is defined as assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and restore essential government services.

d. In both the domestic and foreign environments action is normally implemented at the national-level (US or HN governments), with DOD providing support, as directed. Domestically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead in managing a national level emergency response, with the NRP providing guidance for conducting and managing response to incidents of national significance. Chapter II, "Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management," provides guidance regarding the applicable process and regulations that govern the DOD response to a domestic CBRNE event. In foreign environments, DOS leads the response efforts of the USG. Chapter III, "Foreign Consequence Management," addresses the roles and responsibilities of DOD forces providing FCM support after a CBRNE event overseas. The CBRNE CM activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRNE with potential to cause high casualties and large levels of destruction are the focus of this publication.

The terms “incident management,” “crisis management,” and “consequence management;” and the relationships between them, are discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Homeland Security*.

3. The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Overview

a. Addressing the impact of an accidental, intentional, or natural release of CBRNE material is the basis for the CBRNE CM activities performed by DOD. CBRNE CM encompasses CM actions taken to address the consequences from all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear agents or substances, and high-yield explosives with potential to cause mass casualties and large levels of destruction. In response to nuclear accidents or incidents involving US nuclear weapons in DOD or Department of Energy (DOE) custody, refer to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, which provides a concept of operations as well as the functional information necessary to execute a comprehensive and unified response to a nuclear weapon accident.

b. CBRNE CM is normally managed at the national level (US or HN governments), with DOD providing support as directed. During combat operations, DOD leads the operational response in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies.

(1) DSCA policy and procedures guide DOD forces in a domestic response. DSCA, a subset of civil support (CS), refers to support provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilian, and military contract personnel and DOD agencies and components during immediate response and in response to approved requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. This response includes support to Federal agencies providing assistance to local, state, and tribal authorities within the US, territories, and possessions for CBRNE CM operations. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) policy provides guidance for the operational framework upon which the CBRNE CM joint force’s relations with local, state, tribal, and Federal officials are built.

(a) **The mission of the US military is to fight and win the nation’s wars, to defend the homeland, and to conduct other operations in accomplishment of national objectives.** The military’s primary mission does not include domestic law enforcement or civil administration, nor does it encompass domestic long-term recovery or restoration operations. CBRNE CM support shall emphasize DOD roles, skills, and structures, such as the ability to mass, mobilize and provide logistic support.

(b) **The joint force chain of command and civilian oversight within DOD will be clear.** The joint task force (JTF)-CBRNE CM commander reports directly to the supported combatant commander (CCDR), who in turn reports to the SecDef and the President. Within DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) (ASD[HD]) is the principal civilian advisor to the SecDef on domestic CM activities for CBRNE incidents.

(c) **The military forces responding to a CBRNE CM event will generally operate in a support role to the lead or primary agency, unless the President has directed**

that DOD is the lead. In most CBRNE CM situations that have been declared to be an incident of national significance, DHS will be the lead agency. In any case, DOD may provide assistance that has been approved by the appropriate authorities.

(d) DOD civil support promotes and leverages the unique skills of the Reserve Component (RC) within the homeland.

(2) When approved by the President, the USG may provide FCM support to a HN either at the request of the HN or upon HN acceptance of a USG offer of assistance. DOS is the lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President. HN requests for assistance and/or USG offers of assistance will be made through the LFA. This is normally the chief of mission (COM). When requested by the LFA and directed by SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations through a designated supported geographic combatant commander (GCC). DOD actions in support of USG FCM operations will be coordinated through the LFA. The USG response may use the NRP International Coordination Support Annex construct to guide the USG response if the situation dictates and the LFA so wishes. GCC actions will be guided by status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), other international agreements, DOD policy, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), memorandums of agreement (MOAs) established with the HN, and contingency plans.

(3) DOD support to CBRNE CM will formally exist when requested by civil authorities until civil authorities have reestablished normal operations or otherwise directed by SecDef. The final phase, leading to full recovery, will almost always be addressed and coordinated by civil authorities in both the domestic and foreign environments.

c. In CBRNE CM, interagency and intergovernmental coordination are of paramount importance. Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between agencies of the USG for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective. Interagency coordination is conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and while individual tasks and organizations may differ on each level, the essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and capabilities. In conducting CBRNE CM as a supporting agency, DOD must coordinate closely with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to ensure unity of effort and success of the mission.

For more information on interagency coordination see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.

d. **CBRNE Incidents.** During a CBRNE incident, CBRNE CM efforts must make the preservation of life a priority. This is a significant shift in mindset for JFCs, staff personnel, and CBRNE CM planners. The planning process begins with determining and assessing potential CBRNE consequence and the endstate the supported CCDR plans to achieve. CBRNE consequences are the result of an accident or intentional incident involving chemical agents, biological agents, radiological sources, nuclear devices, or high-yield explosives, and/or industrial

materials that are hazardous by themselves or when mixed with other material, including hazards from industrial pollutants and waste, and will produce a toxic effect in exposed personnel. For the purposes of this JP; a TIM will be used as a generic term for toxic, infectious, or radioactive compounds in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form. TIMs may be used or stored for use for industrial, commercial, medical, military or domestic purposes. TIM may be chemical, biological, or radioactive and described as a toxic industrial chemical (TIC), a toxic industrial biological (TIB), or toxic industrial radiological (TIR) materials. The effects of an incident/event involving a particular material may result in infirmity, injuries, sickness (physiological or psychological), structural damage, death, and/or contamination. CBRNE CM includes those measures and methods of responding to CBRNE events to alleviate damage, loss of life, hardship or suffering caused by the incident; protect public health and safety; emergency restoration of essential government services and infrastructure; and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE situation. The method of response will include use of standing contingency plans and procedures to determine what forces and capabilities are required and committed in support of requests for assistance. Figure I-1 illustrates the relationship between CBRNE events, their effects, response methodology, and the response force level and type used to mitigate the effects of CBRNE events. CBRNE CM includes preparing for and responding to the consequences of CBRNE incidents, no matter what their causes. Accidents may occur at chemical plants, nuclear power plants, or other facilities that have the potential for release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material, or during the transportation of such toxic industrial CBRN material. Intentional acts include use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by adversaries, (whether global, regional, or nonstate), sabotage, and other acts of terrorism. CBRN materials present hazards that can be both immediate and delayed. In some instances the delayed effects can cause more problems for joint forces and may alter the CBRNE CM response activities.

e. Chemical Agents and their Effects

(1) Chemical agents include any chemical substance which, is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. In contrast, TICs include any chemical substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form that may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic purposes that produce toxic impact to personnel, materials, and infrastructure.

(2) When distinguished by their effects on human physiology, chemical agents fall into five categories: blood (cyanide compounds), blister (vesicants), choking (pulmonary agents), incapacitating, and nerve. Chemical agents may also be categorized by their persistency. Agents are described as persistent when, after release, they may remain in the environment for hours to days and nonpersistent when they remain for 10 to 15 minutes. Persistent agents are primarily contact hazards while nonpersistent agents are primarily inhalation hazards.

(3) The greatest risk with TICs lies in exposure to inhaled chemicals, but emergency responders may receive lethal or incapacitating dosage through ingestion or absorption through the eyes or skin. A variety of industries use and produce chemicals that pose hazards to individuals if exposed to sufficient quantities or concentrations. In many instances, chemical warfare




Figure I-1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Methodology (A Different Mindset)

individual protective equipment does not provide protection from TICs (e.g., chlorine gas, sulfuric acid).

(4) For information on TIC hazards, see the current edition of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pdfs/2005-149.pdf>). The sources of these environmental and industrial hazards may be quite extensive in an industrialized area. Any site that stores or uses toxic chemicals may pose a threat to personnel even if the site is operating under normal conditions. Industrial accidents or sabotage, such as destruction of a large industrial complex, may release these potentially toxic substances.

(5) Regardless of the nature of the toxic chemical, CBRNE CM operations will focus on life saving and prevention of further injury tasks to include: responding immediately to treat identified casualties; securing and decontaminating the area to prevent spreading of the chemical; decontaminating people possibly exposed; and providing support to a displaced populace. In

many instances, chemical warfare individual protective equipment does not provide protection from toxic materials nor is it certified for use in support of civilian authorities outside of a battlefield environment.

See US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) Tech Guide 244 for further information. See also Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/Department of Justice (DOJ) publication, Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid.

f. Biological Agents and their Effects

(1) Biological agents are microorganisms that cause disease in personnel, plants, or animals or cause the deterioration of material. Biological agents are divided into two broad categories; pathogens and toxins.

(a) Pathogens are infectious organisms that cause disease or illness in their host and include bacteria, viruses, rickettsias, protists, fungi, or prions.

(b) Toxins are biologically derived poisonous substances produced as by-products of microorganisms, plants, or animals. They can be naturally or synthetically produced.

(2) Examples of biological agents and their associated diseases are *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), AIV H5N1 (avian influenza), *Clostridium botulinum* (botulism), *Shigella* species (food borne illness), Hantavirus (pulmonary syndrome), *Legionella pneumophila* (Legionnaire's disease), *Histoplasma capsulatum* (histoplasmosis), *Yersinia pestis* (bubonic and pneumonic plague), Variola virus (smallpox), *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia), and Ebola virus (viral hemorrhagic fever).

(3) Infectious biological organisms represent one of the greatest potential threats due to their reproductive ability and the time delay from infection to symptom. An infectious biological attack may remain undetected for several days to weeks after release due to the incubation periods that biological agents may have. Diagnosis may be slow as many infectious agents have a slow onset and present with nonspecific symptoms that rapidly escalate in severity. Another compounding problem is that patients may simultaneously present in geographically separated areas. Depending on the pathogen, preventive measures and treatment will be difficult to implement due to factors such as large number of casualties, restriction of movement, and quarantine. Finally, first responders may be among the first casualties, rapidly overwhelming local and state support systems.

(4) Terrorists and other enemy elements may attempt to use biological agents to infect people, agriculture, industry, and the environment.

(a) When people are infected, hospitals may be the first source to notice an increase in specific symptoms. Alternatively, the first signs of an attack may be unusually high and widespread purchase of over-the-counter medicines by civilians within a region. Hospitals

report to their departments of health and to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC and National Institutes of Health can then recommend steps for containment and treatment.

(b) Agriculture can be attacked through animals or crops. This type of attack can affect a nation's food supply, economics, and international trade.

(c) Bacteria can be bio-engineered for specific functions. An example is an oil-eating bacteria. This technology could be used to deteriorate or contaminate industrial supplies or materials.

(5) TIB. This category encompasses any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes which could cause a potential infectious or toxic threat. It includes those biohazards which are infectious agents or hazardous biological materials that present a risk or potential risk to the health of humans, animals or the environment. The risk can be direct through infection or indirect through damage to the environment. Biohazardous materials include certain types of recombinant DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid]; organisms and viruses infectious to humans, animals, or plants (parasites, viruses, bacteria, fungi, prions, rickettsia); and biologically active agents (toxins, allergens, venoms) that may cause disease in other living organisms or cause significant impact to the environment or community. TIBs are often generated as infectious waste (sharps and body fluid contaminated material) and as biological samples (biopsies, diseases for research, etc.).

g. Sources of Radiation and Effects

(1) Radiological Sources. Radioactive materials cause damage by the ionizing effects of neutron, gamma, beta, and/or alpha radiation. These sources can be found in a number of military and civilian environments, including nuclear power plants, hospitals, construction sites, and others.

(2) Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are devices, other than a nuclear explosives device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, area denial, or injury.

(a) RDDs are designed to disperse radiation and/or contamination. One design, called "dirty bombs," uses explosives to disperse radioactive contamination. A dirty bomb typically generates its immediate casualties from the direct effects of the conventional explosion (i.e., blast injuries and trauma). The main purpose of a dirty bomb is to frighten people by contaminating their environment with radioactive materials and threatening large numbers of people with exposure. Their use may also result in area denial and costly cleanup or decontamination.

(b) By scattering the radiological material, the RDD may create a large area of radiological contamination. The actual dose-rate will be dependent upon the type and quantity of radioactive material spread over the area. This may not be uniformly distributed. As an area denial weapon, an RDD can generate significant public fear and economic impact since the area

affected may involve loss of use during a lengthy and costly decontamination process. The contaminated area poses a danger to individuals by external or internal radiological contamination. External contamination on individuals can usually be removed by surface cleaning, and by removing contaminated clothing. Internal contamination is much more dangerous and occurs when contaminants are ingested and/or inhaled and concentrate in tissue. This may result in prolonged, high intensity local radiation exposure.

(3) TIRs. TIRs are any hazardous radioactive material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. Radioactive waste, such as spent fuel rods and medical radiological material, is a major source of these materials. By far the largest quantities of radioactive waste — in terms of both radioactivity and volume — are generated by the commercial nuclear power and military nuclear weapons production industries, and by nuclear fuel cycle activities to support these industries such as uranium mining and processing. Radioactive waste is classified by origin not on the physical and chemical properties of the waste that could determine its safe management. Radioactive materials can produce toxic or long term health effects to personnel, and can cause contamination. Damaging effects from radiological materials are caused by neutron, gamma, beta, and alpha ionizing radiation.

h. **Nuclear Material.** Nuclear detonations cause three types of injuries: blast, thermal and radiation, as well as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects described further in a later section.

(1) Blast injuries are caused by the overpressure wave traveling outwards from the center of the nuclear detonation. The types of injuries are the same as occur with conventional explosives and are further described in the next section.

(2) Thermal injuries present as flash burns (burns from direct exposure to the thermal radiation pulse, typically ultraviolet, visible, and infrared waves) or flame burns (burns from materials set afire by the infrared energy wave igniting flammable materials).

(3) Radiation injuries from a nuclear blast occur from two sources: prompt and residual. Prompt radiation effects occur due to the neutrons and high-energy gamma rays emitted immediately by the weapon. Severity depends on the weapon's yield, emission spectrum, and distance to the target. Residual radiation effects are due to emissions (typically alphas, betas, and low energy gammas) from fission fragments (the heavy atom products produced during fission) and activated environmental materials (when materials absorb radiation and become radioactive themselves). Collectively, these sources are called fallout. The amount of fallout depends on the weapon's yield, type, and height of burst, while the area affected depends heavily on the wind. The hazard to personnel depends on the level of radiation present and the duration of exposure.

(a) Ionizing Radiation. The extent of tissue damage resulting from exposure to ionizing radiation depends on the type of radiation and the dose of exposure experienced.

1. Localized or focal tissue damage. One type of localized injury “beta burns” results when skin is exposed to beta emissions, either an intense source or for a long

period. Another type of localized or focal tissue damage may be a result of an internal dose as a result of inhalation or ingestion of a radioactive particle. For example, if the common fission product iodine-131 is inhaled or ingested, it will likely concentrate in the thyroid gland and may cause tissue damage.

2. Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) occurs from whole-body exposure to radiation, not just specific areas of the body . . . the higher the radiation dose and dose rate, the earlier the symptoms will appear and more danger to exposed personnel. Individuals with a combination of injuries, blast and/or thermal combined with radiation exposure, will be more vulnerable to ARS.

For additional information, see Military Medical Operations Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, <http://www.afrr.i.usuhs.mil>.

(b) The long-term effect for people exposed to radiation depends upon the damage done to the person's tissue by the ionizing radiation. Typically, there may be an increased risk of cancer. Anyone with a significant radiation exposure should be included in a monitoring program for any long-term health effects.

(c) Communications capability is essential for accurate situational awareness. The possible disruption of the information and communications infrastructure during a CBRNE incident is a key consideration in consequence management planning. Commercial communications may be disabled or saturated making day-to-day communications (radio, cell phone, phone, 911, etc.) unusable. Nuclear detonations may not only create physical damage to this infrastructure, but also temporarily disrupt communications transmission. EMP damage from a nuclear detonation may cause national disruptions in the information and communications infrastructures. EMP will be widespread, possibly across entire continental areas if nuclear detonation occurs at high altitudes, generally several tens to hundreds of miles above the ground. Nuclear detonations at any height will generate EMP, but the intensity and duration of the pulse and the affected area will vary with the height of detonation. It is expected that at a minimum, local disruptions in information and communications infrastructures will result from EMP. Nuclear detonations may also affect radio transmissions for some hours after the burst. It is important to understand that commercial electromagnetic interference standards are not designed to protect against EMP attacks. During such an event, there could be widespread disruption of electronics. All electronics may not be affected; however, because in order to do so, they would need to be connected to some larger "antenna." For example, a turned-off computer without any cables or wires attached to it would likely avoid damage from an EMP, since the physical size of the computer may be small enough that it may not collect enough energy to be affected. But when it is plugged in, and/or when other cables are attached, it becomes part of a much larger network of wires, which form an antenna. Additionally, national concern triggered by the incident will demand immediate, accurate information flow both to the public and for emergency managers and leaders at all levels of government to manage the response effectively and efficiently. Joint forces develop and maintain a common operational picture that allows the joint force to gain situational awareness. Joint forces providing CBRNE CM may need to augment or replace the communications infrastructure in the affected areas using organic equipment such as the mobile subscriber equipment that has the capability of tying into the commercial telephone network and which normally operates using portable line-of-sight microwave links when wired links are

not viable or not available. Consistent, accurate information flow to the public is essential to ensure the response matches the needs in the affected area. Nuclear effects may not only create physical damage to this infrastructure, but also temporarily disrupt telecommunications transmission.

i. Classification of Explosives

(1) Explosives is categorized as high-explosives (HE) or low-order explosives (LE). HE produces a defining supersonic overpressurization shock wave. Examples of HE include Trinitrotoluene, nitroglycerin, dynamite, and ammonium nitrate fuel oil. LE create a subsonic explosion and lack HE's overpressurization wave. Examples of LE include TICs, pipe bombs, gunpowder, and most pure petroleum-based bombs such as Molotov cocktails or aircraft improvised as guided missiles. HE and LE cause different injury patterns.

(2) Explosive and incendiary (fire) bombs are further characterized based on their source. "Manufactured" implies standard military-issued, mass produced, and quality-tested weapons. "Improvised" describes weapons produced in small quantities, or use of a device outside its intended purpose, such as converting a commercial aircraft into a guided missile. Manufactured (military) explosive weapons are exclusively HE-based. Terrorists will use whatever is available – illegally obtained manufactured weapons or improvised explosive devices (also known as "IEDs") that may be composed of HE, LE, or both. Manufactured and improvised bombs cause markedly different injuries.

(3) Conventional explosives can generate casualties in several ways depending on the type of explosion, secondary effects of the explosion (e.g., building collapse, fire), and the surrounding environment of the explosion (e.g., confined spaces, availability of debris or materials to generate an expanding area of potential injuries). TICs may also be used as a source of high-yield explosives (e.g., ammonium nitrate when mixed with diesel fuel).

j. Consequences of Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives on Infrastructure

(1) A CBRNE incident can disrupt production and delivery of essential goods and services. Water supplies may be contaminated or unable to flow to incident area populace. Public health and emergency services will likely be affected by the CBRNE incident either directly by their proximity to the incident or indirectly by the overwhelming need for the emergency response. EMPs destroy or cause transitory disruption of the power grid and damage or destroy portable/mobile electronic devices or equipment. The transportation and communication infrastructure may be stressed through evacuations, providing relief supplies, or as a direct result of the CBRNE incident. The response required by a joint force could potentially span the range of these effects. Joint forces are designated as the secondary support agency for all the ESFs as stated in the NRP and could conduct relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, communication, rescue and recovery missions, security missions, or provide technical assistance for these support functions. Chapter II, "Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management," provides guidance on the applicable law, regulations, and policy that govern DOD assistance to domestic civil authorities, and Chapter III, "Foreign Consequence Management," addresses DOD FCM activities and assistance.

(2) Support to civil authorities may also include specific public health support to state and local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mortuaries, and pharmacies, to include distribution of pharmaceutical stockpiles. Other disrupted services may include postal, banking and finance. Joint forces supporting civil authorities may assist in responding to the needs of affected communities. A primary concern to all response efforts is restoration of government functions to the affected area. Effects to public safety and security may result directly from CBRNE attacks on government institutions or indirectly from cascading disruption of the institutions. Indirect effects include cascading disruption and financial consequences to government, society, and the economy through public and private sector reactions to an incident. Joint forces have the capability to assist in this area by supporting civil authorities in restoration of essential goods and services.

(3) Another consequence of CBRNE incidents is infrastructure and terrain contamination. Contamination from a CBRNE event can be concentrated or be spread over a significant area depending on the means of delivery and the agent used. These areas are of operational concern during the recovery phase of the incident. For larger areas of contamination, forces may be requested to assist civil authorities logistically by providing transportation for the affected population, assisting with decontamination efforts, assisting with infrastructure restoration, and monitoring operations.

(4) Degradation or stoppage of a DOD installation mission may occur. Efforts of installation personnel and potentially local or HN personnel may be used to reconstitute essential missions; however, the effectiveness and timeliness is incident specific. The seam between the installation and the community during a CBRNE incident may be nonexistent due to the local responders responding to their community; however, response to a DOD installation incident is a Service responsibility.

(a) Service plans must address transfer of mission procedures, if necessary, due to a CBRNE event occurring either on or close to the installation. Installation protection requires the ability to detect, assess, warn, defend against, and recover from a CBRNE attack.

(b) SOFAs, DOD policy, MOUs, and MOAs may provide guidance regarding CBRNE CM support to or from the local authorities (although it must be noted that local MOUs and MOAs may not be legally enforceable). Consult the supporting legal office for guidance.

For more information on CBRNE CM on installations, see DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, as well as other Service publications.

4. The Joint Force in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Environment

Overarching requirements for a joint force in a CBRNE CM environment are two-fold: the joint force must shape the composition of the response through proactive planning and interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental coordination; and the joint force must protect each member of DOD in support of civil authorities. The CBRNE CM environment causes joint forces to plan in a unique way. Plans will be unique in that they must recognize the primary reason for employment of the joint force is to mitigate the consequences of a CBRNE event/incident. Planning considerations, discussed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management,” and Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management,” are significantly different for the joint force conducting CBRNE CM as the primary mission, than for joint forces conducting other missions. Requirements for protecting joint forces remain a constant priority for the JFC, especially when operating in a contaminated environment. Supporting civil authorities also may entail unique legal implications, and these must be considered through all phases of planning and operations.

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CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

“During emergencies the Armed Forces may provide military support to civil authorities in mitigating the consequences of an attack or other catastrophic event when the civilian responders are overwhelmed. Military responses under these conditions require a streamlined chain-of-command that integrates the unique capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian responders.”

**National Military Strategy of the USA
March 2004**

1. Domestic Response Framework

a. **Domestic CBRNE CM Command and Control.** The joint force conducting CBRNE CM will usually be in support of a Federal agency. The SecDef always retains control of Federal (Title 10) military forces providing CBRNE CM. The state governors, through the adjutants general, control National Guard forces when those forces are performing active duty in their state role and when performing active duty under Title 32, United States Code (USC). The JFC remains within the normal chain of command for military forces from the President, as Commander in Chief, to the SecDef, to the CDR. If the JFC is a National Guardsman, the individual can maintain dual Title 10/Title 32 authority over forces, if agreed to by the President and the state governor. National Guard soldiers and airmen may serve either in a Federal status like other reserve soldiers, or in a state status (state active duty or Title 32 status) under the command of the governor. When serving in their home state for disaster relief, they typically will serve in state status. National Guard soldiers and airmen serving in state status are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), (18 USC Section 1385), which generally prohibits Service members in Title 10/Federal status from engaging in civilian law enforcement activities (unless constitutional or statutory exceptions apply). Some state laws, however, also restrict the law enforcement activities that can be performed by National Guard members even when in state status. Statutory exceptions to the PCA include the Insurrection Act and Federal laws that allow the Attorney General to ask the SecDef to authorize the use of active duty forces to assist in law enforcement activities after a CBRN incident. The JFC normally provides support when civil authorities request DOD support, evaluated by DOD authorities and approved by SecDef or designated representative. The evaluation criteria used by DOD authorities includes legality (compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk (safety of DOD forces), cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget), appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD to conduct), and readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission). Planning an effective, proactive response to mitigate a CBRNE event includes considerations that contribute to saving lives, preventing injuries, reducing human suffering, providing temporary critical life support, and providing shelter to the affected populace.

For more information on the request for assistance process and dual authority under Title 10/Title 32, USC, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.

For more information, refer to the following: JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

b. **Key Executive and Legislative Guidance.** Presidential decision directives (PDDs), national security Presidential directives (NSPDs), HSPDs and executive orders (EOs) are the primary means by which the President issues national security policy guidance. These Presidential documents, national level strategy documents, and laws provide the basis for the development of subordinate and implementing guidance by DOD agencies. A list of documents that provide guidance for CBRNE CM are contained in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents.” The following documents deserve special note due to their direct applicability to CBRNE CM:

(1) **HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents.*** The NRP was developed as a result of HSPD-5 to integrate the Federal Government current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards plan to unify the domestic incident management process. When the NRP is used, national interagency plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National Search and Rescue Plan, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and National Maritime Transportation Security Plan are incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans. In addition to consolidating Federal plans, other modifications within the NRP that impact DOD are the establishment of a National Operations Center (NOC), the establishment of an Interagency Advisory Council (IAC), and the creation of a principal Federal official (PFO), who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security at the incident site. A national incident management system (NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents was also a result of HSPD-5.

(2) **HSPD-8.** This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes how Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident. It establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the US to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness (including CBRNE) goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, state, and local entities.

(3) **The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.** The Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for Federal participation in domestic disaster relief. When incidents of national significance that are declared disasters or emergencies by the President occur, Federal support to states is delivered in accordance with relevant provisions of the Stafford Act. A governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or emergency if the governor finds that effective response to the event is beyond the combined response capabilities

of the state and affected local governments. Based on the findings of a joint Federal-state-local preliminary damage assessment indicating the damages are of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant assistance under the act, the President may issue a major disaster or emergency declaration. Federal assistance takes many forms — including the direct provision of goods and services, financial assistance (through insurance, grants, loans, and direct payments), and technical assistance — and can come from various sources. Under the NRP construct, DOD is designated a support agency for all emergency support functions (ESFs) and a cooperating agency for a number of NRP support and incident annexes. The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to Federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility.

(4) **The Economy Act (Title 31 USC, Section 1535).** In accordance with the Economy Act or other applicable authorities, Federal agencies participating in the NRP request may provide federal-to-federal support by executing interagency or intraagency reimbursable agreements. Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures.

(5) **Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385).** Under the PCA, active-duty Federal military personnel may not participate in law enforcement activities except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. However, Congress specifically authorized military forces to engage in law enforcement activities when dealing with emergency situations involving nuclear materials. See 18 USC 831 and DODD 5525.5.

(6) **The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.** The NSHS complements the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US by providing a road-map for mobilizing and organizing the Nation to secure the US homeland from terrorist attacks. This includes objectives around which society can mobilize, align and focus on homeland security functions, align budgetary resources to the task of securing the homeland, and account for performance on homeland security efforts. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also complements the National Security Strategy by expanding on the actions necessary to address the need for proactive counterproliferation, strengthened nonproliferation efforts, and effective CBRNE CM to combat WMD.

c. Key Department of Defense Guidance

(1) **Implications.** DOD guidelines are promulgated in a variety of documents that include strategy documents, planning guidance, DODDs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy documents. These documents are consistent with and complementary to the Federal statutes and national security policy discussed earlier. DODDs specifically address missions for homeland defense (HD) and CS operations to include CBRNE CM. A list of key DOD guidance documents is provided in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents.” The following documents, further discussed in Appendix A, are of special note:

(a) The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support that builds on the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

(b) The DODD 3025 series of directives that provide policy on and responsibilities for CS activities.

(c) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01A, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation*, that provides operational and policy guidance for US military forces supporting domestic CBRNE CM operations to prepare for and respond to the effects of a threatened or actual CBRNE situation.

(2) **Special Considerations.** The following discussion provides general guidelines for functional areas that are associated with CBRNE CM. They also have specific legal implications of which commanders should be aware.

(a) **Intelligence Oversight Collection and Information Sharing Handling**

1. The judge advocate's (JA's) role is especially important during domestic operations as the parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are overseas. Military commanders' need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on the rise — they expect force protection information and counterintelligence to be integrated into domestic operations due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering arena. DOD intelligence components are subject to one set of rules referred to as intelligence oversight. Everyone else in DOD, except the military criminal investigative organizations are subject to a different set of rules governed by DODD 5200.27. Therefore, the commander must direct his need for information or intelligence to the right component — the component with the capability and authority to achieve the commander's intent. Figuring out the nature of the data and the right unit to gather it are areas that often require JA input.

2. In light of today's changing environment, commanders and their staffs should carefully consider the different rules when planning domestic operations. This section examines the proper role of DOD intelligence components during these operations; the rules regarding the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about US persons; and the JA's responsibilities in this area.

(b) **Psychological Operations (PSYOP).** US law and DOD policy prohibits DOD from using PSYOP units to conduct operations against US citizens. However, these assets can be used to help disseminate critical information to the civilian population. DOD may use PSYOP personnel and equipment to support activities such as information dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting.

(c) **Use of Weapons and Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).** CJCSI 3125.01A, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical,*

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, Enclosure E, establishes a presumption that units deployed to sites of a CBRNE situation will not carry arms. Units may deploy to sites of CBRNE situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently authorized to carry arms by the SecDef or is deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where weapons are authorized. Military commanders are responsible to ensure that weapons and ammunition are properly stored and physically secured. Military members providing security for stored weapons and ammunition at military facilities during CBRNE CM operations may carry their weapons while performing their normal security duties. In accordance with CJCSI 3 121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (S)*, mission-specific RUF for CBRNE CM operations are set forth in CJCS Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 0500-98 (U), Annex C. National and local decisions about force protection conditions (FPCON) may have an impact on the arming policy. The decision to implement a particular FPCON is a command decision and the JTF commander may set a higher FPCON if warranted by threat level assessments for the joint operations area (JOA). FPCON is based on an assessment of the vulnerability of JTF personnel or facilities, criticality of personnel or facilities, availability of security resources, impact on operations and morale, damage control considerations, and other international or US actions. Because the CBRNE CM mission is most likely in response to a terrorist attack, it is highly likely that deterrent measures may include requesting SecDef authorization to arm the response forces along with taking other additional security measures based on local FPCON.

(d) **Immediate Response.** The DOD policy on immediate response addresses the authority delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide immediate assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be associated with a declared or undeclared disaster. The potentially catastrophic nature of CBRNE incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces conducting CBRNE CM under immediate response authority, but there are no policy exceptions or special authorities for CBRNE CM. A JFC, responding to a SecDef approved DSCA mission and/or execute order (EXORD), is like any other DOD military commander and may find the need to exercise his/her immediate response authority with available forces. This is particularly relevant in the event of a second terrorist attack or TIM release within the JOA, since trained medical and specialized CBRNE assessment/response teams are on the scene and able to rapidly respond to time-sensitive requests from the civil sector. It is important for commanders to understand that the policy is limited, restrictive, and conditional. The situation is a bona fide emergency which overwhelms the ability of civilians to respond and meets the restrictions criteria within DOD and Service directives. As soon as practical, the military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, shall report the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center, so that the information is received within a few hours of the local commander's decision to provide immediate response support. Immediate response requests in the event of a CBRNE incident may include, but are not limited to:

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE DURING THE 1906 SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE

Immediate response authority reflects the historical role of the military, particularly the Army, to provide an immediate or emergency response to the civilian community in case of disaster. This authority is firmly entrenched in current Army Regulations, forerunners of which may be traced to the early twentieth century. One of the most celebrated examples of the use of this authority in this century was the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire. There, General Frederick Funston, commander of the Department of California and, at the time of the earthquake, the Pacific Division, deployed all troops at his disposal to assist civil authorities in both a civil disturbance and a disaster relief role. Destroying large parts of the city, the earthquake and resulting fire left 250,000 San Franciscans homeless. Troops were immediately employed to stop looting and to protect Federal buildings such as the mint and the post office. In addition, they assisted firefighters in battling the conflagration. While General Funston telegraphed the War Department to inform it of his actions, he took those actions he deemed necessary in what was clearly an emergency situation.



Lurid flames sweep San Francisco in William Alexander Coulter's panorama of the largest maritime rescue in United States history, where more than thirty thousand people were taken from the shoreline between Fort Mason and the foot of Lombard Street. Mr. Coulter's painting depicts the flotilla of rescue vessels ferrying survivors from the burning city to Sausalito.

SOURCE: The Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco

1. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public health.

2. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosives ordnance from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services.

3. Detection, assessment, and containment (initial steps taken to facilitate emergency evacuation and public awareness warnings).

4. Roadway movement control and planning.

5. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-fighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel).

For more information on hazard immediate response authority see JP 3-26, Homeland Security, and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

(e) **MOUs/MOAs** for mutual assistance are often established between military installations and local communities. If an installation commander receives a request for assistance directly from local civil authorities prior to a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the requesting agency should be referred to the local/state emergency management channels, unless an immediate response condition exists or a mutual assistance agreement is in effect. Installations may have entered into earlier mutual assistance agreements with the local community in the areas of fire-fighting, hazardous materials, medical evacuation and/or other areas, as appropriate. Dependent upon circumstances, this type of support may not be considered immediate response. Accordingly, requests for assistance under mutual assistance MOUs/MOAs must be considered in accordance with applicable DOD and Service directives.

2. Roles and Responsibilities in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

a. **DOD and the National Response Plan.** When conducting CBRNE CM operations in accordance with the NRP, DOD will be in support of a lead or other primary agency. The domestic operating environment for DSCA presents many challenges to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the statutory and operational relationships among all Federal agencies involved in the operation. Therefore, commanders and staffs at all levels must be knowledgeable about the NRP and the NIMS and know how their commands fit in to the overall NIMS framework. **DOD provides assistance to the lead or other primary agency upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef.** The NRP contains a number of incident annexes that apply to CBRNE situations. Each annex lists the coordinating agency or agencies and cooperating agencies involved in the response, provides information on applicable policies, authorities, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and responsibilities of cooperating agencies for the particular incident described. DOD is a cooperating agency for the following CBRNE CM related incident annexes:

(1) Biological incident.

(2) Catastrophic incident.

- (3) Nuclear/radiological incident.
- (4) Oil and hazardous material (HAZMAT) incident.
- (5) Terrorism.

For more information on Federal department and agency roles and responsibilities for CBRNE CM see the National Response Plan and the NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

b. DOD Roles and Responsibilities. A brief synopsis of specific DOD roles and responsibilities applicable to CBRNE CM is provided below:

(1) **Secretary of Defense.** SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment for CS, to include CBRNE CM. SecDef has the primary responsibility to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident. There may be circumstances or national objectives when DOD is required to temporarily assume the lead for the Federal response based on Presidential decision. Should facts and circumstances of an actual catastrophic incident warrant a significant DOD role, scope and duration should be defined. A non-DOD civil authority will assume lead responsibility at the earliest opportunity, consistent with operational requirements.

(2) **ASD(HD).** The Office of ASD(HD) is within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). ASD(HD) serves as the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager and provides policy oversight for all domestic CBRNE CM support.

(3) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]).** ASD(SO/LIC) supports planning by the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager for the contingent use of US counterterrorism forces in response to domestic terrorist incidents.

(4) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]).** ASD(HA) is a critical component in the Services' activation of the Federal coordinating centers (FCCs). FCCs are DOD and Veterans Affairs medical facilities responsible for locating all civilian beds in their geographic location, arranging the transport of patients from arriving aircraft, and all logistics in support of receiving mass casualties from a disaster area.

(5) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy ASD(ISP).** ASD(ISP) is the principal advisor to the SecDef and the USD(P) on issues relating to combating WMD including nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.

(6) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]).** ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring RC readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of RC forces into response efforts.

(7) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to CBRNE CM incidents, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the lead or other primary agency for CBRNE CM, and provides strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of operations.

(8) **Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) and the Request for Assistance Process.** JDOMS, located within the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), produces military orders as they pertain to domestic emergencies, forwards them to the SecDef for approval, and then to the appropriate military commander for execution. A six-step process is initiated when a request for assistance (RFA) is received from a lead or other primary agency:

- (a) Lead or other primary agency initiates the RFA.
- (b) RFA is sent to the DOD Executive Secretary for assessment/processing.
- (c) RFA is processed and sent to ASD(HD) and JDOMS.
- (d) JDOMS processes the order.
- (e) SecDef approves the order.
- (f) JDOMS issues the order to appropriate combatant commanders, Services, and agencies.

(9) **Combatant Commands**

(a) **Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), and Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM).** These CCDRs have specific responsibilities for assisting domestic civil authorities in their areas of responsibility (AORs) and are the supported commanders during CBRNE CM operations. In addition to the HD mission, these commanders, when directed by the President or SecDef, provide CS, to include CBRNE CM operations. Other geographic and functional commands support CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and CDRUSPACOM in their CBRNE CM efforts.

(b) **Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).** When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts special operations in support of CrM and CBRNE CM activities. CDRUSSOCOM may also provide liaison officers and other assistance to the supported CCDR, as required.

(c) **Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM).** When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM is a joint force provider and provides deployment, employment, and redeployment of common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in domestic CBRNE CM operations and provides aeromedical evacuation as required.

(d) **Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).** CDRUSJFCOM supports CBRNE CM operations through the assigned roles of joint force provider, joint force integrator, and joint force trainer, and through joint concept development and experimentation.

(e) **Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).** CDRUSSTRATCOM conducts space operations, consisting of force enhancement, space control, space support, and force application, as the single point of contact for military space operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead CCDR for integrating and synchronizing DOD in combating WMD which includes CBRNE CM. In this role, CDRUSSTRATCOM will integrate and synchronize applicable DOD efforts across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities related to CBRNE CM efforts. CDRUSSTRATCOM has established a Joint Functional Component Command to serve as the Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(10) **Subordinate Commands**

(a) **Commander, US Army North (CDRARNORTH).** When approved by SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRARNORTH deploys military resources and forces and conducts military support operations to help Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities respond to a CBRNE incident within the homeland.

(b) **Commander, Joint Task Force — Civil Support (CJTF-CS).** When approved by SecDef, and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJTF-CS deploys military resources and forces, and conducts military support operations to assist Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in responding to a CBRNE incident within the homeland. When domestic incidents occur in the CDRUSPACOM or CDRUSSOUTHCOM AORs, they will be the supported commander and CJTF-CS deploys in their support.

(c) **Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK).** JTF-AK is comprised of Alaskan Command personnel, a subunified command of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM). Placed under the operational control (OPCON) of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for HD (and CS) operations, JTF-AK is responsible for preventing, deterring, defending, and defeating national security threats within the Alaska JOA.

(d) **Commander, Joint Task Force — National Capital Region (CJTF-NCR).** When approved by SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJTF-NCR provides command and control (C2) of military support operations to help Federal, state and local authorities respond to a CBRNE incident within the National Capital Region.

(11) **Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).** SecDef appoints the DCO to serve as DOD's single point of contact at a joint field office (JFO). The JFO is the multiagency coordination center established locally for Federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. Requests for DSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated and processed through the DCO.

(12) **Military Services.** When approved by SecDef, the Military Services provide forces, facilities, and assets to the supported CCDR as part of the DOD response to a CBRNE incident. Specifically the Service Chief responsibilities are as follows:

(a) Provide the Joint Staff, J-3, with information on assigned CBRNE CM capabilities, assets, units, and research or support facilities that are capable of providing reach-back or on-scene support to CBRNE CM operations.

(b) Identify units available to the supported CCDR consistent with Title 10 USC.

(c) Provide designated forces, to include RC forces, in order to prepare for and respond to a CBRNE situation, and support to the supported combatant commander through the appropriate Service component commanders.

(13) **Reserve Component Forces.** National Guard and reserve forces are known collectively as RC forces. They are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime operations and prevention of conflict. Air sovereignty alert is a full-time mission of RC forces. RC forces consist of the Army National Guard (ARNG), Air National Guard (ANG), US Air Force Reserve (USAFR), US Army Reserve (USAR), US Naval Reserve (USNR), US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), and US Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). Guidelines for utilization of RC forces can be found in Title 10 and Title 32 USC.

(a) **Chief, National Guard Bureau.** The National Guard Bureau facilitates and resources ANG and ARNG forces and assets through the states adjutants general to conduct CBRNE CM operations to assist state, local and tribal authorities in responding to a domestic CBRNE CM incident.

(b) **National Guard (NG).** The NG primarily operates under three different command relationships: **Federal funding and Federal control (Title 10 USC – “federalized” status); Federal funding and state control (Title 32 USC); and state active duty (state funding and state control).** NG forces, unless federalized, operate under the C2 of the governor and adjutant general in state active duty and/or Title 32 status. The NG, when in state status, responds under the governor's control for CS missions in accordance with state laws. However, when NG personnel or units are federalized by order of the President under Title 10 USC, they respond under the same legal restrictions and C2 structures as active component military forces. The NG, when in state status, is also normally the first military responder to CS incidents that require resources beyond the capabilities of local and other state-level emergency response organizations. Working under the control of the governor, their actions are closely coordinated with those of other agencies, to include any DOD assets committed to the same or related incidents. Additionally, in many states, the adjutant general is also the state's director for emergency

management, and as such, not only controls the response of the state's NG forces, but also manages and coordinates the state's response to CBRNE CM in support of local governments.

(c) **Reserve Forces.** Each of the seven RCs is structured and operated in a manner similar to its respective Active Component (AC) counterpart. Unlike the ARNG and ANG, the remaining five RC organizations (USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, USCGR) operate under the same C2 relationships in both peacetime and wartime and do not have state-specific relationships. When called to active duty, RC forces conduct civil support missions under Title 10 USC guidelines exactly as AC forces. While on active duty, members of the ARNG, ANG, USAR, USNR, USAFR, and USMCR are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. RC forces are called to active duty through the mobilization/demobilization process.

For more information on the RC mobilization/demobilization process, see JP 4-05.1, Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up.

(14) **US Coast Guard (USCG).** USCG is a Military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to the DHS (Title 14, USC 1). When directed by the President, or by a Congressional declaration of war, the USCG transfers to the Department of the Navy for operations. However, at any time, USCG may also assist the Navy without transferring forces by attaching USCG units to a Navy command. The gaining Navy commander would exercise tactical control (TACON) of these attached USCG units.

(a) USCG's homeland security (HS) mission is to protect the US maritime domain and the US marine transportation system and deny their use and exploitation as a means for attacks on US territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Additionally, USCG will prepare for and, in the event of attack, conduct emergency response operations.

(b) USCG (under DHS) is the lead or other primary agency responsible for the conduct and coordination of maritime security operations carried out under civil authorities for HS in the US maritime domain. When USCG is serving in this role, DOD assets will serve in a supporting role. However, C2 relationships will be tailored to the particular situation. There are situations where USCG is a supporting agency operating in support of other Federal, state, and local civil agencies and coordinates its domestic and foreign operations through these agencies. In all cases, operations are governed by unity of effort and agreed protocols. In its maritime law enforcement role, USCG has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas and is the only Military Service not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act (i.e., it is unique among the Services in that it has statutory law enforcement authority).

(15) **Combat Support Agencies (CSAs).** CSAs provide direct support to the CCDRs performing CBRNE CM during emergency situations and are subject to evaluation by CJCS. The seven CSAs are the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Each plays a critical role in supporting CBRNE CM operations by ensuring the supported

commander has the information, situational awareness, logistics, and contracting support necessary to carry out the mission.

For more information on DOD and CSA roles and responsibilities, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.

3. Plans for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

a. National Response Plan

(1) The NRP guides the Federal response to any given emergency or disaster. It uses the foundation provided by the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-5, and the Stafford Act to provide a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Most joint force domestic CBRNE CM operations will be authorized as a result of the President declaring a disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act establishes the programs and processes for the Federal Government to provide disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. The provisions of the Stafford Act cover all hazards including natural disasters and terrorist events. Relevant provisions of the Stafford Act include a process for governors to request Federal disaster and emergency assistance from the President. As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.” The NRP framework provides the following to guide a response to incidents of national significance:

(a) Best practices and procedures from various incident management disciplines — homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, fire-fighting, hazardous materials response, public works, public health, emergency medical services, and responder and recovery worker health and safety — and integrates them into a unified coordinating structure.

(b) The framework for Federal interaction with State, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs in the context of domestic incident prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.

(c) The foundation for the development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to effectively and efficiently implement Federal incident management activities and assistance in the context of specific types of incidents.

(d) Integration of the capabilities and resources of governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident management.

(e) Separate incident annexes for biological events, catastrophic events, oil and HAZMAT, terrorism, and nuclear/radiological events. The joint force has a CBRNE CM role with specified and implied tasks in each of the CBRNE areas as well as in many of the ESF annexes (see the NRP for details).

(f) The NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement provides the operational framework for implementing the strategy contained in the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex.

(2) National Incident Management System Framework

(a) Joint forces performing CBRNE CM supporting civil authorities are part of domestic incident management and operate in accordance with the NRP. The NIMS forms the foundation for conducting domestic response operations. This framework provides a consistent approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Joint forces conduct CBRNE CM in accordance with NIMS but maintain a distinct, independent chain of command. However, military personnel can and frequently will receive tactical direction from the on-scene commander and subordinates, especially in circumstances where small numbers of military personnel augment civilian response functions. Installation forces operating under immediate response authority stay under the control of the Service branch of the chain of command unless committed to the Federal response effort by the Secretary of Defense. Under NIMS, installation and joint forces may find themselves getting task direction from a civilian firefighter, law enforcement officer, or emergency medical technician, but this functional working relationship does not replace or circumvent the military chain of command. Key to success for joint forces conducting CBRNE CM is to establish and maintain unity of effort within the framework of NIMS while maintaining unity of command within DOD. The joint force's understanding of the NIMS is fundamental to providing effective and efficient support to civil authorities. Figure II-1 describes the NIMS based on three levels: the field level, the regional level, and the national level. A joint force will interact within the framework of NIMS either directly with the DCO or indirectly at all three levels.

(b) To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, state, and local capabilities, NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system (ICS); multiagency coordination systems; incident management training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); personnel qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. NIMS builds upon the ICS which establishes a management concept that can be used to manage joint force response to almost any event, whether an emergency incident, a public service activity, or another project of any kind. It can be used equally well for both small and large situations, and it can grow or shrink in size as the needs of the situation require. ICS consists of a philosophy, a set of rules, and a way of organizing an incident that provides uniformity and consistency in coordinating and controlling activities.




Figure II-1. National Incident Management System Framework

**ARLINGTON COUNTY AFTER-ACTION REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO
THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON**



Incident Command System and Unified Command: The primary response participants understood the Incident Command System (ICS), implemented it effectively, and complied with its provisions. The Arlington County Fire Department, an experienced ICS practitioner, established its command presence literally within minutes of the attack. Other supporting jurisdictions and agencies, with few exceptions, operated seamlessly within the ICS framework. For those organizations and individuals unfamiliar with the ICS and Unified Command, particularly the military, which has its own clearly defined command and control mechanisms, the Incident Commander provided explicit information and guidance early during the response and elicited their full cooperation.

SOURCE: Arlington County After Action Report, 23 July 2002

(c) At the national level, the IAC is comprised of senior Federal representatives from the DHS, DOD, other Federal departments and agencies, and NGOs as required. The IAC plans and coordinates Federal strategic incident management efforts, to include assessing national impacts and those associated with the actual or proposed Federal response and anticipating future Federal resource and operational requirements for the incident. The NOC is the primary national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational awareness. The NOC consists of a multiagency watch and operational coordination center that fuses law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting.

The NOC facilitates homeland security information sharing and operational coordination with other Federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental emergency operations centers (EOCs).

(d) At the regional level, the regional response coordination center (RRCC) coordinates regional response efforts, establishes Federal priorities, and implements local Federal program support until a JFO is established at the field level. The RRCC establishes communications with the affected state emergency management agency and coordinates deployment of the emergency response team – advance element (ERT-A) to field locations, assesses damage information, develops situation reports, and issues initial mission assignments. A DOD regional emergency preparedness liaison officer who assists in coordinating requests for defense support may also operate within the RRCC.

(e) At the field level, the incident command structure (as detailed in the NRP) is used. The incident command is analogous to a tactical-level unit and directs on-scene emergency management. The incident command will most likely be formed with incident management officials and responders from Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as private and nongovernmental organizations. An area command is established when the complexity of an incident and incident management span-of-control considerations dictate. CBRNE incidents that require the involvement of joint forces will likely be of such scope and magnitude. A unified area command is typically established by the administrator(s) of the agency or governmental body having jurisdictional responsibility for the incident when multiple incidents occur, or when the incidents under the authority of the area command span multiple jurisdictions. This allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively. The area command sets overall incident-related priorities for supporting agencies; allocates critical resources according to the established priorities; ensures that response to incidents is properly managed; ensures effective communications; ensures that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency policies; identifies critical resource needs and reports them to the interagency coordination system, usually EOCs; ensures that short-term emergency recovery is coordinated to assist in the transition to full recovery operations; and provides for personnel accountability and a safe operating environment. EOCs at the state, county, and local levels represent the location where information and resource coordination occur to support incident management activities.

(f) The JFO is a multiagency coordination center established at the field level. The JFO is the primary hub for coordination of Federal, state, local, tribal, private, and nongovernmental organizations to manage the CBRNE incident. The JFO is a temporary Federal facility established locally to coordinate operational Federal assistance activities to the affected jurisdiction(s) during incidents of national significance. Other Federal operations centers or operational entities, to include the JTF headquarters, also collocate at the JFO whenever possible. In the event collocation is not practical, the JTF headquarters will be connected virtually to the JFO and will assign liaisons to the JFO to facilitate the coordination of Federal incident management and assistance efforts. There are three organization components within the JFO — the coordination group, coordination staff, and sections. The structure of the JFO is shown in Figure II-2.




Figure II-2. Notional Joint Field Office Organization

1. The JFO Coordination Group. Consists of the PFO, the Federal coordinating officer (FCO), the state coordinating officer (SCO), other senior Federal officials such as the senior Federal law enforcement officer, and possibly other nongovernmental and private-sector representatives. If a JTF is established by the CCDR, consistent with operational requirements, its C2 element will be collocated with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The PFO has no direct authority over other officials, but represents the Secretary of Homeland Security as the lead Federal official. The PFO ensures overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management and resource allocation activities; ensures seamless integration of Federal activities in support of and in coordination with state, local, and tribal requirements; provides strategic guidance to Federal entities; facilitates interagency conflict resolution as necessary; serves as a primary point of contact for Federal interface with state, local, and tribal senior elected/appointed officials, the media, and the private sector; provides real-time incident information to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the NOC and the IAC as required; coordinates response resource needs between multiple incidents as necessary or as directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security; coordinates the overall Federal public communications strategy locally to ensure consistency of Federal interagency communications to the public; and ensures that adequate connectivity is maintained between the JFO and the NOC; local, county, state, and regional EOCs; nongovernmental EOCs and relevant elements of the private sector. The FCO conducts an initial appraisal of the types of assistance most urgently needed; coordinates the timely delivery of Federal assistance to affected state, local, and tribal governments and disaster victims; supports the PFO; administers the financial aspects of assistance authorized under the Stafford Act; works in partnership with the SCO; and takes other action consistent with the authority delegated to him or her as deemed necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining assistance to which they are entitled. The SCO is the state's counterpart to the FCO, managing the state's incident management programs and activities.

2. JFO Coordination Staff. The JFO coordination staff provides specialized assistance to the JFO. The DCO is the single point of contact from DOD in the JFO for civil support. The defense coordinating element (DCE) is the DCO's staff. The DCO with the DCE processes requirements for military support; forwards mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DOD channels; and assigns military liaisons to activated ESFs, as appropriate. The collocation of the JTF C2 element does not replace the requirement for a DCO/DCE as part of the JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate requests for assistance for DOD. ESFs reflect a grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an NRP organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal following domestic incidents. The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to Federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility.

See Appendix B, "Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions," for more information on ESFs.

3. JFO Sections. JFO sections are established, as necessary, to meet the essential management functions of operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration.

a. The operations section coordinates operational support to on-scene incident management efforts. Branches may be added or deleted as required, depending on the nature of the incident. The operations section also is responsible for coordination with other Federal command posts that may be established to support incident management activities. The 15 ESFs provide staff and resources to the sections of the JFO, principally the operations section, consistent with the purpose and scope defined in the NRP annexes. A joint force conducting CBRNE CM should be aware of their activities through the DCO. The joint force conducting CBRNE CM will not typically be involved with law enforcement activities. Figure II-3 contains a list of ESFs with their short title.

b. The planning section collects, evaluates, disseminates, and uses information regarding the threat or incident and the status of Federal resources. It is also responsible for preparing and documenting Federal support actions, and developing strategic, contingency, long-term, and other plans related to the threat or incident, as needed. The planning section provides current information to the JFO coordination group to ensure situational awareness, determine cascading effects, identify national implications, and determine specific areas of interest requiring long-term attention. The planning section also provides technical and scientific expertise.

c. The logistics section coordinates the logistic response of the Federal Government to the entire disaster area and coordinates closely with the state and local officials for

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS	
Emergency Support Function	Title
1	Transportation
2	Communications
3	Public Works and Engineering
4	Firefighting
5	Emergency Management
6	Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
7	Resource Support
8	Public Health and Medical Services
9	Urban Search and Rescue
10	Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
11	Agricultural and Natural Resources
12	Energy
13	Public Safety and Security
14	Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
15	External Affairs

Figure II-3. Emergency Support Functions

distribution management. This section coordinates logistic support to include control and accountability for Federal supplies and equipment; resource ordering; delivery of equipment, supplies, and services to the JFO and other field locations; and transportation coordination and fleet management services.

d. The finance/administration section is responsible for the financial management, monitoring, and tracking of all Federal costs relating to the incident and the functioning of the JFO while adhering to all Federal laws, acts, and regulations.

b. **Contingency Planning.** CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and CDRUSSOUTHCOM are DOD's principal designated agents and supported commanders for domestic CBRNE CM. As such, they are responsible for the development and execution of CBRNE CM plans in their respective AORs. As supporting functional combatant commands, CDRUSSTRATCOM, CDRUSTRANSCOM, AND CDRUSJFCOM have support plan responsibilities and these efforts need to be coordinated with the supported combatant command. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is used to conduct joint planning and execute and monitor the actions necessary to accomplish the mission.

(1) **CONPLAN 0500, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation.*** CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for the development and maintenance of CONPLAN 0500. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 0500-05 provides policy, authorities, and capabilities to address CBRNE CM requirements.

(2) **CONPLAN 2501-05, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).***

(3) **US Pacific Command CONPLAN 5002-05, *Concept Plan for Homeland Defense and Domestic Civil Support.*** CONPLAN 5002 articulates the responsibility for domestic consequence management to include: the State of Hawaii; the US territories of Guam, American Samoa, and Jarvis Island; the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Freely Associated States Under the Compacts of Free Association, which include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau; and the US possessions of Wake Island, Midway Atoll, Johnston Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Kingman Reef. USPACOM 5070, identifies military support to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace operations, refugee operations, and consequence management.

c. **Crisis Action Planning (CAP).** Upon receipt of a warning order regarding a domestic CBRNE incident, the responsible CCDR initiates CAP. This time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources involves the CCDR and his or her staff, the operational forces, and the tactical units identified to respond to the incident. Planning considerations for responding to a CBRNE incident are contained in Chapter IV, "Planning Considerations."

4. Joint Force Considerations

a. **Flexible Tiered Response.** Military support will be tailored to the scope and magnitude of the situation and will be focused on capabilities to meet the response requirements beyond the resources of civil authorities. The appropriate CBRNE CM C2 headquarters is determined based on size and complexity of the DOD required response, in accordance with a flexible tiered response concept. Figure II-4 describes a tiered response strategy for CBRNE CM.

(1) Tier One is normally implemented for small scale, localized CBRNE incidents having met SecDef criteria to implement CJCS CONPLAN 0500, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation*. The criteria have an impact on national level decision making, but are transparent to tactical operations. In a Tier One situation, the DCO can effectively exercise command over the small number of DOD forces required and still execute his functional responsibilities with respect to processing mission assignments. The DCO is supported by a DCE and emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), and maintains various reachback capabilities for technical advice and assistance. USNORTHCOM's standing CBRNE CM joint task force, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) may be directed to provide a joint planning augmentation cell (JPAC) or other assistance to the DCO to assist with CBRNE response planning and execution. Specialized personnel, services, supplies, and equipment will be required from DOD to support the Tier One response. Technical and advisory reachback may be required and can be found at USNORTHCOM, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), DTRA, and 20th Support Command.

(2) Tier Two is the normal response posture for CBRNE incidents having met the SecDef criteria to implement CJCS CONPLAN 0500 and the need to establish a JTF to respond to the incident. Specialized units, detachments, teams, supplies, and equipment will be required from DOD in the Tier Two response along with enabling and sustainment forces. Extensive technical expertise and advisory reachback are also often required. The DCO, DCE, and EPLOs perform their traditional role in validating and coordinating mission assignments. The commander of a JTF normally is delegated OPCON of all DOD forces designated in the EXORD, to include the DCO and DCE, executing CBRNE CM support operations in the designated operational area. JTF-CS is trained and organized specifically for this mission. Other JTFs may be established (if required) and referred to as a JTF for consequence management (JTF-CM). These JTFs may require joint augmentation, particularly when formed from a Service headquarters. Their staffs often receive direct support from USNORTHCOM's JTF-CS JPAC and technical expertise from DTRA's Operation Center as well as other DOD units and agencies to enhance its capabilities. A Tier Two headquarters (HQ) is typically considered first as the C2 element. The President or Secretary of Homeland Security will declare an incident to be catastrophic for CBRNE events that occur on the homeland soil. Initial response efforts will be in accordance with the NRP-Catastrophic Incident Annex. Additionally, the CBRNE situation has met SecDef criteria, and CJCS CONPLANS regarding CBRNE CM have been executed. CBRNE incidents are difficult for state and local authorities to quickly assess in terms of clearly articulating Federal assistance requests and requirements may not be fully appreciated for lack of experience with CBRNE effects. Rather than a stable and clearly bounded problem, it will be one of cascading effects and expanding consequences.




Figure II-4. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Tiered Response Options

Technical and advisory reachback may be required and can be found at USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, DTRA, and 20th Support Command.

(3) Tier Three involves extremely complex CBRNE scenarios impacting a wide geographic area or a large population, or threatening national security. Multiple incidents in different operational areas are supported by multiple JTFs. Since multiple JTF commanders (including Commander, JTF-CS) have command of DOD forces conducting the CBRNE CM response within their respective operational areas, the situation may require the designation of a Tier Three JTF to assume command of all DOD forces responding to the situation in order to achieve unity of command. The DCO, DCE, and EPLOs continue to perform their role in validating and coordinating DOD support to Federal agencies. Technical and advisory reachback is required.

b. Organizing Considerations

(1) A JTF for CBRNE CM is organized in a manner similar to a conventional JTF. A senior JFC, typically the CCDR, normally establishes a CBRNE CM JTF to plan and conduct CBRNE CM operations. JTF-CS was established in 1999 and is now a subordinate command to USNORTHCOM. The JTF may be established subordinate to a geographic combatant command or subunified command. For example, a GCC may elect to form a JTF to conduct CBRNE CM operations in a specific region of the theater. The initial establishment of a CBRNE CM JTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect the CBRNE CM JTF commander's ability to fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in joint operations, CBRNE CM operations, and interagency cooperation, into a functioning CBRNE CM JTF. Therefore, key personnel assigned to a standing or potential CBRNE CM staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with a CBRNE CM JTF HQ, must understand both interagency and CBRNE CM techniques and procedures in order to alleviate this problem and allow for an efficient operation of a CBRNE CM JTF. Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF HQ can be found in JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

(2) **Augmentation.** As the JTF staff conducts CAP and anticipates that mission requirements will exceed the JTF staff's capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), the commander, joint task force (CJTF) should request assistance from the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR should be prepared in advance to identify or request possible resources from both the AC and RC forces to meet critical needs. Additionally, these augmentees should train regularly with the CBRNE CM JTF if it is organized on a standing basis.

(3) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).** GCCs have the capability to provide the core of a JTF through their SJFHQ. The SJFHQ is a permanently manned, cross-functionally organized, tailorable nucleus for an operational JTF headquarters. The SJFHQ may augment a current JTF or employ as a core of a JTF. The SJFHQ is equipped to work in a collaborative information environment for the CJTF.

(4) **Joint Planning Augmentation Cell.** The JPAC is a tailored group of functional CBRNE CM joint planners that assist JTF staffs or the DCE. There are several organizations that train and staff JPACs (JTF-CS has the capability to provide two on short notice) to augment other JTFs or DCEs upon receipt of mission. JPAC members maintain currency in CBRNE CM areas through professional education, participation in joint and multiagency exercises, and through planning for national special security event contingencies. The JPAC is able to focus an ad hoc JTF staff on how to employ joint forces in conducting CBRNE CM. The JPAC will also assist the JTF with obtaining technical augmentation from (or at least dedicated reachback capabilities) DTRA, US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, US Army Forces Command's (FORSCOM's) 20th Support Command (CBRNE), and the CDC. These experts maintain liaison and reachback capability for the JTF and JPAC to national-level expertise, while providing on-staff subject matter expertise. The JTF medical officer, in particular, should consult with these technical experts, as they are also able to provide information critical to medical planning considerations.

(5) **Technical Augmentation and Liaison.** CBRNE incidents entail operational and force health protection risks. The affected community and Federal partners in the response may also need technical advice in effects mitigation.

(a) **DTRA.** The DTRA representative should have expertise in CBRNE/TIM event modeling and potential consequences of CBRNE events. If there is no DTRA representative, refer to DTRA's National Atmospheric Release Capabilities Listing and Center for Special Weapons Effects, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Threats, Technology Transfers and Resources unclassified website or classified website for further information. Access on the unclassified network can be requested through the DTRA Operations Center, opscntr1@dtra.mil. If no DTRA representative is available, North American Aerospace Defense Command J-33N can provide the same modeling capabilities, has classified networks, and can provide CBRNE briefs.

(b) **USAMRIID.** The USAMRIID representative should be an expert in epidemiology and biological warfare defense.

(c) **CDC.** The CDC expert serves as the on-staff augmentation for the national level emergency preparedness and response, the Laboratory Response Network, and Public Health emergency response, to include expertise on the Strategic National Stockpile.

(d) **20th Support Command (CBRNE).** The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) is subordinate to US Army FORSCOM. Its representatives can serve as liaison to the CJTF and are knowledgeable of the command's capabilities and units.

(6) **Boards, Centers, and Cells.** The CJTF may elect to organize boards, centers, and cells to facilitate a number of functions required of the CBRNE CM JTF. To assist in this decision, the staff should determine what organizational structures have been formed within the JTF, and what organizational structures have been delegated to the CJTF by the supported CCDR. The CJTF must then decide what boards, centers, and cells would be best suited to support the

JTF mission and functions. A notional representation is presented in Figure II-5. The DCO is typically attached to the JTF and resides within the JFO as the DOD single point of contact under the NRP. JTFs typically will require planning, logistics, medical fusion, current operations, future operations,




Figure II-5. Joint Task Force Staff Boards, Centers, and Cells

communication, and intelligence coordination centers and boards. Larger incidents may add requirements for joint mortuary affairs, movement control, contracting, public affairs, visitors, and a standing personnel reception center.

(7) **Joint Intelligence Support Element.** The joint intelligence support element performs two critical functions for CBRNE CM: analysis and intelligence support to planning. Analysis includes analyzing the potential for follow-on threats/incidents and the analysis of the incident's consequences on people and infrastructure. Intelligence support to planning integrates this analysis into current and future planning efforts. The geospatial information systems (GIS) databases integrated with CBRNE modeling provide a powerful tool with which to conduct analysis, depicting real-time incident effects and potential effects for the current and/or follow-on incidents. Figure II-6 depicts various GIS data sets used in the modeling process.

c. **Response Operations.** Response operations consist of the following five phases:

(1) **Phase I — Alert/Preparation/Situation Assessment.** Situational awareness is vital to understanding the CBRNE CM operation parameters. The situation may warrant, due to indicators and warnings or credible threats, the CAP process to begin before a CBRNE event occurs. Determination of joint force command structure, the DOD anticipated response, and early and thorough collaboration with Federal departments and agencies is paramount. Alerting and preparing the joint force may be directed through a normal CJCS warning order; however, CBRNE incidents may also occur without warning resulting in accelerated procedures and possibly even verbal guidance.

(2) **Phase II — Deployment.** Echeloning the needed joint force assets at the appropriate time is the key to success during this phase of the operation. Establishing a base support installation (BSI), which may occur during the first phase, or during a transition between these phases, is a key consideration, and is explained in further detail in Appendix C, "Base Support Installation Considerations." Conducting joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) is essential for mission accomplishment and protection of the joint force. Forces that are directly involved in life saving and preventing further injury will have the highest movement priority for CBRNE CM force deployment. Following in movement priority will be forces that assess/establish operations or provide temporary critical life support, and following that, will be those forces necessary to establish and sustain operations. Biological incidents may or may not provide a clear point of origin. In this case, task force (TF) medical may be the primary effort and have priority in movement. In some biological cases, such as anthrax, there will also be a clean up requirement. Elements of TF response will normally have priority for movement in the force flow because it contains those capabilities needed to relieve and/or augment the efforts of first responders (i.e., monitoring, marking, decontamination, hot-zone extraction, security). This TF will normally be employed closest to the actual incident site. CBRNE CM response units should be immunized to prevent unnecessary delays in response posture. Inoculation may occur at home base, an intermediate staging base, or the BSI based on availability of vaccine(s), time required for vaccine to be effective, and time-distance criteria. Units must meet force health protection standards established for the operation prior to deployment into an operational area. For units stationed in an operational area, health protection standards will be met prior to employment. Health protection standards will be established in the operation order or deployment order. The CJTF will have to consider all these




Figure II-6. Geospatial Information Systems Data Layers

factors and recommend a viable course of action (COA) to the supported CCDR at the earliest available opportunity. Forces will be transferred to the JTF and command relationship will be established as designated in the EXORD. The JTF then directs completion of JRSOI. Exceptions will be noted in CCDR's orders. After coordinating with the BSI, the JTF will commence JRSOI operations. Phase II ends when the JTF and applicable DOD forces are closed/secured in the operational area and the CJTF determines that forces are ready to execute the mission. Success is achieved when BSIs are established, forces are deployed, and the JTF has established C2 of DOD forces and prepared to respond to Federal agency-generated mission assignments.

(3) **Phase III — Support to Civil Authorities.** Planning and execution efforts will be synchronized with the efforts of the supported civil authorities. Phase III begins when DOD forces

begin executing mission assignments within the operational area. The coordinating agency typically assigns mission assignments to supporting or cooperating agencies for action. DOD accepts mission assignments as RFAs, which become mission assignments only after they have been approved by the SecDef. During this phase, the primary focus will be on mission assignments that involve lifesaving, injury prevention, and providing temporary critical life support efforts. The CJTF will exercise OPCON or TACON over all designated DOD forces as directed by the CCDR's EXORD. The JTF may task organize functionally, by Service components, or a combination of both, depending on the situation. An example of tasks associated with requests for assistance is provided in Figure II-7. TF medical will have medical augmentation, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and life support capabilities. TF support will have the preponderance of the heavier logistic support capabilities (i.e., supply, transportation) and will focus on mission assignments in such areas as displaced population support and mortuary affairs. The JTF is responsible for executing mission assignments using the allocated DOD forces within the designated operational area. The JTF is also responsible for requesting additional forces from the supported CCDR if those within the designated operational area are not adequate. During Tier II operations, the



Figure II-7. Anticipated Tasks and Requirements

JTF will receive mission assignments from the DCO/DCE after they have been validated. The JTF will maintain force readiness of assigned forces in the designated operational area and manage supplies and equipment brought in to support anticipated mission assignments.

(4) **Phase IV — Transition.** Transition of functions to civil authorities begins when the civil authorities and the JTF, as well as the supported combatant commander, agree to implement the transition plan. Transition plans will be executed on order. The plans should possess measures of effectiveness based on the nature of the incident, local environment, personnel affected, and support requirements. An effective and efficient transition phase will conclude with a clear and expedient transfer of CBRNE CM responsibilities as soon as the end state conditions are met. This phase ends when all activities are transferred to the designated authorities. Success can be described as the complete transfer of responsibilities to another military HQ; Federal, state, local agencies; or NGOs and forces begin preparation for redeployment. Beginning early in the planning process, the JTF and TF commanders have the responsibility to develop transition and redeployment plans that include transferring support responsibilities to other HQs, Federal, state, local agencies or NGOs. TF commanders will coordinate these efforts by submitting transition criteria to the supported JTF. Mission assignments given to the JTF in support of civil authorities have been successfully executed, either, to the point of completion, or ready to be transitioned to another command or agency.

(5) **Phase V — Redeployment.** Redeployment begins when forces are directed to prepare for redeployment. This is an on order mission given by the combatant commander to the CJTF. Determining when forces are no longer needed is important and should be determined/defined as soon as the situation permits. This decision may be made in conjunction with the lead or other primary agency or unilaterally by the Secretary of Defense. Uncommitted forces will normally redeploy initially. Forces no longer required to support anticipated mission assignments are recommended to the supported CDR for redeployment. Particular attention should be given to high-demand, low-density units possessing specialized, unique skills that may be needed elsewhere. Selective redeployment may occur concurrently with the reception of additional forces. Additional forces will redeploy after their functions are completed or transferred back to other entities. Redeploying forces may require decontamination, medical observation/evaluation based on the pathogen/hazard involved. Success is defined when all forces, less follow-on or remaining forces, have redeployed to their designated home station.

CHAPTER III FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

“Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our government. As part of our defense, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.”

**President George W. Bush
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
December 2002**

1. General

a. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and to restore essential government services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response. When requested by the LFA and directed by the SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the CBRNE event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the effects of the CBRNE incident.

b. DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated efforts in response to requests from the LFA to support a HN. FCM may require specialized capabilities to include but not limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, urban search and rescue, public health and medical care, and public notification efforts beyond the scope or scale of traditional disaster relief efforts. Additionally, DOD will provide representation to the DOS-led foreign emergency support team (FEST)/consequence management support team (CMST) to support USG FCM operations, as requested by the DOS and directed by the SecDef. DOD will retain C2 of all DOD assets (personnel, infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG FCM operations. In the event that the DOS is unable to effectively coordinate a FCM response (i.e., uncertain or hostile environment, no official DOS presence in-country), or in the absence of a foreign government request due to a collapse of the government or the government ceasing to function, the President may direct DOD to serve as the LFA.

For further guidance on foreign assistance, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Doctrine for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

c. When conditions resulting from any emergency or attack require immediate action, local military commanders may take such actions as may be necessary to save lives, prevent human

suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such compelling conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, commanders or officials acting under the “immediate response authority” may take necessary actions to respond to requests from authorities. They must advise higher headquarters by the most expeditious means available, and seek approval and additional authorizations as needed. The GCC will notify the US COM at the time of the higher headquarters notification.

d. The USG provides assistance to the foreign government, upon the direction of the President of the United States. Although the HN’s response capabilities may be overwhelmed, the HN government always retains primary responsibility for the CBRNE CM response on its soil.

e. There are other instances wherein DOD may respond to a CBRNE incident on foreign soil; however, these situations are not considered to be FCM and this publication does not apply:

(1) DOD acts to protect and/or mitigate CBRNE effects on US/coalition forces during major combat operations in order to continue the mission (CBRN passive defense).

(2) When directed, DOD provides assistance, mission permitting, to foreign civilian populations affected by CBRNE material during the conduct of major combat operations in a foreign country where the Department of State does not have an established presence.

(3) DOD response to CBRNE incidents that occur and are contained on DOD installations and facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary CBRNE CM responsibility under relevant international agreements or arrangements. DOD Instruction 2000.18 applies to these instances.

f. In the last instance, DOD responds to CBRNE incidents that occur and are contained on DOD installations and facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary CBRNE CM responsibility under relevant international agreements or arrangements (including binational and SOFAs). In this instance, the installation commander should inform/coordinate with DOS and HN authorities, as appropriate. However, if the CBRN contaminant, plume, or its effects are believed to reach areas off the installation, or the CBRNE event occurs adjacent to the installation, DOD may initially respond to requests for assistance from local authorities in order to save lives per immediate response authority, while coordinating with HN authorities, and, as necessary, informing higher HQ and the US embassy, until such time as DOS assumes lead agency for FCM, or further guidance is received.

g. FCM does not apply to DOD CBRNE response operations that are conducted within the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, US territories of Guam, American Samoa, Jarvis Island, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Freely Associated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the US possessions of Wake Island, Midway Island, Johnson Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Kingman Reef (domestic CBRNE CM).

For further guidance on CBRNE CM operations as a result of US military actions, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and Service doctrine publications.

2. Responsibilities

a. **Host Nation.** Primary responsibility for responding to, managing, and mitigating the consequences of a foreign CBRNE incident resides with the HN government. In reference to maritime vessels, the flag state is responsible for CBRNE CM activities on the vessel and its crew. A foreign government where a foreign flagged vessel berths, or the flag nation, may request US or international support in responding to or mitigating the consequences of a CBRNE incident.

b. **Department of State.** Typically, DOS coordinates USG support to a HN. When requested by DOS, and approved by SecDef, DOD supports DOS in FCM operations, as appropriate, and as part of the overall USG response.

c. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.** ASD(ISP) serves as the principal advisor for FCM policy, and represent the SecDef on all FCM policy matters outside the DOD, to include interaction with the DOS and other Federal agencies. ASD(ISP) provides oversight and review of all DOD support to FCM operations, and provide policy oversight for the planning and pre-positioning of DOD FCM assets for foreign events, as directed by the SecDef, including but not limited to, international athletic events, summits, and conferences. Additionally, ASD(ISP) serves as the principal coordinator of DOD FCM exercises with the interagency community.

d. **Chief of Mission.** The US COM (normally the ambassador) is the President's top representative in the HN. Normally, all USG support to the HN will be coordinated by the responsible COM and country team. All matters requiring DOS review or approval should be submitted to the COM.

e. **Geographic Combatant Commander.** Each GCC has the inherent responsibility to provide support to DOS as the LFA for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President. HN requests for assistance and/or USG offers of assistance will be made through the LFA. Each GCC will develop plans for foreign CBRNE situations within their assigned AOR. If required, the GCC may designate and/or establish a JTF-CM to provide C2 over DOD assets deployed in support of a FCM operation. The JTF-CM will be tailored to meet the specific requirements of a CBRNE situation. When in a supporting role, CCDRs provide requested forces and assets to the supported GCCs. Each GCC will develop interface procedures for exchanging CBRNE CM operational support requests between COM, Joint Staff, their subordinate commanders, and higher headquarters. The interface procedures should include HN to DOS to DOD to supported CCDRs to supporting CCDRs' protocols, and reside in theater plans or standard operating procedures.

f. **Installation Commanders.** As with US-based installation commanders, if a CBRNE event occurs on foreign territory, US commanders may exercise their immediate response authority; however, it is more restrictive (limited to saving lives) than within the homeland (see CJCSI 3214.01B, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*). The Department of Defense has independent statutory authority (10 USC 404) to respond to overseas manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of life. Under EO 12966, the SecDef provides such assistance at the direction of the President, or in consultation with the Secretary of State. In emergency situations to save human lives, when there is not sufficient time to seek prior concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD may provide assistance, and advise and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter (see also DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*).

3. Operations

a. FCM operations may require a complex and massive coordination effort. USG and national agencies, allied nations' military and civilian agencies, IGOs, and NGOs perform roles in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each entity might maintain a unique capability, coordination of responders is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains responsibility for coordination among USG entities.

b. FCM operations will generally not be conducted during hostile action; however, situations may arise where FCM may be required under less than permissive conditions at the request and support of the HN. For example, insurgents commit CBRNE incidents against a new government. The new government may request response assistance from US and coalition forces. The USG may direct the US military to secure the area around the incident in order to establish the most permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response efforts.

c. **Notional JTF-CM Design.** The organization and makeup of the JTF-CM will depend on the situation and mission. Figure III-1 offers a notional JTF-CM organization structure. The size of component elements depends upon incident severity and mission requirements. Mission requirements will dictate the functional categories required in the responding organization.

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(1) **Consequence management response and assessment (CM R&A) component.**

(a) CM R&A component tasks may include:

1. Incident site reconnaissance and assessments.
2. Incident site entry/exit management.
3. Assistance with decontamination of personnel, equipment, facilities, and/or terrain.




Figure III-1. Notional Joint Task Force-Consequence Management Structure

NOTIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE (cont'd)

APOD	airport of debarkation
CMO	civil-military operations
CM R&A	consequence management response and assessment
DC	displaced civilian
DECON	decontamination
EQUIP	equipment
HN	host nation
INF ELE	infantry element
IRF	immediate reaction force
JTF	joint task force
MED	medical
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MP	military police
NGO	nongovernmental organization
PERS	personnel
PSYOP	psychological operations
RADCON	radiological control
RECON	reconnaissance
SEC	security
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPT	special project team
USNS	United States Naval Ship

Figure III-1. Notional Joint Task Force-Consequence Management Structure (cont'd)

4. Analysis and recommendations to COM, USG agencies, and HN for near-term management of the incident.

5. Medical assessments and screening.

6. Initial interface with local responders.

(b) The exact composition of the CBRNE response element will be based on incident type and severity. Additional response elements may be required based upon the incident's scope and severity.

(c) The radiological control team provides health physicists and/or other technical expertise (radiation control and safety) assistance to the component commander.

(d) The immediate response force consists of a security element, a medical element, and support element.

(2) **Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Component.** CMO component tasks may include:

(a) Assistance in supporting the interface between HN government and outside assets.

(b) Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians.

(c) DOD coordination between other USG organizations, HN organizations, multinational organizations, and NGOs.

(3) **Medical Component**

(a) Medical component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing preventive medicine support to prevent disease and nonbattle injury, to include providing medical surveillance activities for the JTF.

2. Triage of casualties.

3. Treatment for casualties and responders.

4. Augmentation to existing medical treatment facilities in accordance with SOFAs.

5. Assistance in medical administration and management during an incident.

6. Collection of medical specimens as required for laboratory analysis and identification.

7. Patient tracking.

8. Distribution of medical supplies.

9. Administration of immunizations and prophylaxes, as required.

10. Patient transports.

11. Stress management.

12. Patient decontamination.

13. Detection.

14. Security.

(b) The medical component surgeon coordinates the activities of the subelements for the JTF commander through the component surgeons. Elements of the medical component will be sized based upon the severity of the incident and casualty projections from the commander's assessment.

(c) The radiological advisory medical team is specifically trained in radiological health matters, and provides on-site assistance and guidance to the component commander and local medical authorities. This team is normally found within the joint technical augmentation cell (JTAC).

(d) Biological incident-specific augmentation.

1. The US Army chemical and biological advisory team provides on-site advice for chemical-biological (CB) casualty care.

2. The aeromedical isolation team consists of physicians, nurses, medical assistants, and laboratory technicians specially trained to provide care to and transport patients with diseases caused by infectious agents. CDRUSTRANSCOM has waiver authority on movement of contaminated/contagious patients. CDRUSTRANSCOM policy is to move a limited number of patients (up to 50) only under extreme circumstances.

3. The Army's special medical augmentation response – aeromedical isolation team (SMART-AIT) consists of physicians, nurses, medical assistants and laboratory technicians specially trained to provide care to and transport a limited number of patients (up to two simultaneously) with diseases caused by highly contagious, infectious agents. With appropriate coordination, SMART-AIT may be deployed in an FCM environment, but does not possess organic air or ground transportation assets.

(4) Clean-Up Component

(a) The JTF-CM clean-up component may provide initial assistance to the HN in decontamination and initial clean-up services to protect public health and safety, and restore essential services. Protracted off-base site clean-up and long-term remediation is the responsibility of the affected country. The clean-up component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing support for decontamination efforts.

2. Providing assistance in critical infrastructure restoration.

3. Assistance in initial off-base site clean-up and debris removal.

4. Providing support to decontamination of fatalities.

(b) Engineer capabilities within this component fall into three categories.

1. Combat engineers with extensive explosives demolition capability, and limited earth moving and debris disposal capability.

2. Construction engineer units possess an organic capability to accomplish necessary road, facility (including damage control centers), and air infrastructure repairs to support JTF operations.

3. DOD and Contract Assets. DOD engineer assets maintain tremendous design and construction management capability and deployable “Prime Power” elements. DOD contracting capability spans the spectrum of construction services, as well as other contracted support services in order to augment or fill operational voids.

(c) Nonengineer assets within this component, such as water production and transport, communications equipment/facilities, and maintenance and repair of other infrastructure components, are not typically an engineer functional responsibility, but often will require engineer support. As the technical nature of this support increases, the ability of engineer units to adequately support diminishes, and contract expertise is required.

(d) The composition of each of these modules will be based upon required levels of restoration, service capabilities, and availability of assets.

(5) Transportation and Logistics Component

(a) The tasks conducted by this component may include the following.

1. Providing transport support, to include aviation, ground, and, if necessary, waterborne assets.

2. Providing assistance to the HN in the procurement of required logistics.

3. Providing contract support to the JTF.

4. Assisting the HN in the coordination or transportation.

5. Coordinating logistic support for the other components of the JTF.

6. Providing medical evacuation transportation support.

(b) The rotary-wing assets provide the means to move JTF personnel and equipment, and casualties within the vicinity of the incident site. Both fixed-wing and high speed waterborne assets can be used to quickly move personnel, casualties, and equipment

inter- and intra-theater depending upon the locations of the affected areas and the condition of surviving transportation infrastructure (airfields, ports, railroads, etc.).

(c) Depending upon the condition of the remaining transportation infrastructure including roads and railroads, ground transportation units may be able to move personnel, supplies, debris, and equipment in and around the incident area. The CCDR and JTF commander should anticipate the need for substantial ground transportation packages.

(d) The use of a maritime support detachment will be dependent upon waterway and helicopter/aerial access of incident site and JTF transportation requirements.

(6) Security Component

(a) Security component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing force protection and security for JTF, as required.
2. Protecting US citizens and victims.
3. Implementing appropriate antiterrorism measures.
4. Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area.
5. Providing convoy and patient transport security.

(b) Separate security elements may be required to provide airport, military aircraft, sea port, and ship security, as appropriate to the mission being performed.

(c) Coordination with NGOs and IGOs.

(d) Coordination with USG and combatant command crime scene investigators.

d. USG assets available for FCM support include:

(1) **DOS Foreign Emergency Support Team.** The FEST provides a wide range of specialized skills not normally available on-scene. The DOS, through the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is the lead agency coordinating the FEST. When deployed, USG CBRNE CM activities are coordinated by the CMST which can be deployed either as a component of the FEST or as a separate entity. This interagency team is led by the DOS Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Foreign Consequence Management Program. The CMST provides the following: technical assistance to the HN and USG agencies; liaison with the FEST, lead or other primary agency, appropriate GCC, USG agencies, and others; assessments of HN emergency needs; advice regarding the development of USG options for a coordinated FCM response; recommendations for appropriate USG response; and the establishment of relationships among NGOs. Upon approval by SecDef, DOD will provide support to the CMST, as required.

(2) **Department of Energy.** The DOE possesses several teams which provide expertise and advice during a CBRNE CM operation involving mainly radiological or nuclear events.

(a) **Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT).** The CMPT provides technical advice and supports the development of a FCM plan addressing radiological hazards, medical impacts, mitigation of consequences, and the deployment and use of other DOE assets. Additionally, they coordinate and direct the in-field deployment and use of other deployed DOE teams. The team consists of a team leader, two effects prediction personnel, two health physics and data assessment personnel, two communications and logistic specialists, and one medical advisor.

(b) **Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT).** The CMHT is activated immediately following the deployment of any DOE asset. They are the exclusive source for coordinating effects predictions, modeling, and data assessment for field operations until the CMPT is operational.

(c) **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** The RAP provides the initial DOE radiological emergency response capability. Under the RAP, there are several radiological assistance teams to assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at the accident or incident scene. These teams also provide advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery.

(d) **Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST).** The NEST provides technical response to help resolve incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search for, locate, and identify devices or material.

(e) **DOE Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** AMS provides helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial multispectra scanning surveys.

(f) **National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC).** NARAC provides real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a nuclear accident or incident.

(g) **Joint Technical Operations Team.** This team is a combined DOD and DOE team providing technical advice and assistance to DOD nuclear accident regional response forces.

e. DOD assets dedicated for FCM support include:

(1) **Joint Technical Augmentation Cell.** The JTAC is a tailored team that, when directed, deploys to a supported combatant commander's AOR to provide CBRN technical advice and planning assistance for executing FCM operations. The JTAC leverages existing DOD capabilities into an on-call cadre of technical experts drawn from key combatant commander-assigned, Service, and DOD agencies. The JTAC personnel provide a wealth of

technical expertise, experience, and a reachback capability to an established network of contacts within DOD, Federal agencies, and various scientific research and academic communities. The JTAC can be employed by the CCDR to support the combatant command, component command, or JTF-CM. The JTAC also maintains linkage with technical experts in the CMST to ensure the coordination of technical information and analysis between both DOS and DOD.

(2) **Joint Technical Operations Team.** This team is a combined DOD and DOE team providing technical advice and assistance to DOD nuclear accident regional response forces.

(3) **DTRA Consequence Management Advisory Teams (CMATs).** CMATs provide direct operational support to GCCs which provide modeling, simulation, and CBRNE CM technical expertise with significant 24-hour reachback. They can assess CBRNE capabilities of installations and critical facilities, and actual/potential CBRNE locations/facilities, and assist in CBRNE CM planning and training. CMATs can be augmented with legal and public affairs capabilities. Additionally the CMAT may be augmented with health physicists from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute that can provide on-site training to health professionals on the management of nuclear or radiological casualties. The CMAT may be embedded within the JTAC, or as a stand-alone entity.

4. Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations

FCM plans should include support related to essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, CBRNE reconnaissance, public works, fire-fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential and/or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials mitigation, food preparation and distribution, and energy generation and distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require specialized hazard material handling, and decontamination planning efforts to enhance foreign disaster relief efforts. The JFC and staff and subordinate and/or supporting commanders and staffs consider the following when planning FCM.

a. The HN has primary responsibility for CBRNE CM, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements.

b. Normally, DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President. DOD will support the LFA in FCM operations.

c. **Joint Force Mission.** Ongoing military operations take precedence over military support of FCM, unless otherwise directed.

d. Current agreements established, or required, within AOR.

e. Geography of the operational area.

f. Reachback capabilities availability and release ability from CONUS (e.g., modeling and simulation, mitigation assets such as chemical, biological incident response force/weapons of mass destruction-civil support team [WMD-CST] like response assets). Availability of CBRNE CM response capabilities within theater, both military and civilian.

g. Personnel and equipment augmentation requirements.

h. **Security.** Once the operational environment is confirmed, the US force commander determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the mission. The operational environment also determines the rules of engagement to be used within the operational area. The more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission. Operational environments are categorized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The distinction between responding to a CBRN incident conducted in a permissive environment versus a hostile environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction results in inadequate planning and unrealistic expectations. First, the cause of the crisis must be determined. If the crisis is manmade, or if men are manipulating a natural crisis or industrial accident for political purposes, then this becomes an intervention operation, conflict is to be expected, and the environment should initially be considered hostile. Operations in a permissive environment are characterized by commonality of purpose for all parties, a quantifiable understanding of the problem, clear objectives, provision of support until normalcy returns, and level of HN cooperation. Coordinate FCM security efforts with HN security/law enforcement and within HN agreements. When allowed, security at the incident site includes visibly marking the perimeter of the incident site, establishing an entry control point, controlling entry into the site, securing the area around the site, and providing antiterrorism and force protection measures.

i. **CBRNE and Other Infrastructure Reconnaissance.** Determination of the levels and limits of contamination in the area affected by the event. Determination of the effects of all of CBRNE on all of the aspects of the infrastructure.

j. **Decontamination.** Contaminated personnel, equipment, facility, and area decontamination requirements. This includes coordination with medical personnel on patient decontamination requirements.

k. **Mortuary Affairs (MA).** MA includes the search, recovery, tentative identification, decontamination, evacuation, internment, and, when required, temporary internment, disinternment, and reinternment of human remains. MA also involves the operation of processing points that may include MA collection points, theater mortuary evacuation points, and MA decontamination collection points and operation of the personal effects depot(s) and the Dover Point-of-Entry Mortuary (in FCM operations). MA also includes identification and removal of remains, and any decontamination requirements needed for transport. Planning considerations should also include measures to inter biologically contaminated remains. Public health will take precedence over the repatriation of contaminated or contagious remains.

See JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, and CJCS Memorandum 0026-02 for further guidance on contaminated remains.

l. **Medical.** This includes care and treatment of casualties, preventive care, and mental health requirements for HN population, and DOD and non-DOD civilians and personnel. Casualty prediction is an important factor to determine appropriate and timely response capabilities. Patients may require decontamination or quarantine of personnel prior to evacuation from the affected area.

m. **Populace.** Quarantine, evacuation or shelter, protection and sustainment, information dissemination, and next of kin notification issues are planning considerations that must be made by the JFC when determining the needs of the displaced populace.

n. **Legal.** DOS, HN requirements. FCM operations can be subject to a variety of international treaties, HN laws, and US statutes and regulations that apply overseas (e.g., removal of contaminated items, transportation of contaminated materials across borders, HN HAZMAT laws, and US environmental requirements extending outside the continental United States). Usually, DOS will coordinate support to the HN, IGOs, and NGOs that may be involved; providing support for these entities can create fiscal law and other issues.

o. **Public Affairs.** Public affairs support to other Federal agencies, and the HN may include news media operations, and public and command information. The HN public affairs mission is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about HN activities to the public, as well as internal military audiences. HN public affairs efforts are focused at the operational level to enable the commander to gain local public acceptance and approval of HN activities, thereby enhancing its freedom of movement within the joint operations area. Public affairs become a key consideration in FCM to restore public confidence, provide guidance to affected areas and personnel, and to report factual details of the CBRNE event. Public affairs must be coordinated both with DOS and the COM for each affected country.

p. **Health Service Support (HSS)**

(1) Ensure adequate joint medical communications architecture is established to provide compatible and responsive communications for the military HSS system.

(2) Ensure adequate standardization and interoperability policies are in place to ensure all deployable medical systems supporting joint operations are interoperable between Service components. In FCM, this is particularly important relative to deciding on acceptable levels of decontamination, remediation, and exposure guidance.

(3) Review entitlements, applicable laws, and regulations for the provision of US military HSS to military and nonmilitary personnel of another nation.

(4) Coordinate support with outside relief agencies (Red Cross, NGOs, and IGOs) in theater to ensure complete visibility for overall medical situation and requirements.

q. **Medical Logistic Support Requirements.** Includes planning for and identifying the operation's potential requirements for medical support. Early planning and identification of requirements will facilitate the efficient execution of medical supply logistic activities.

r. **Liaison requirements** with other DOD elements; USG agencies, including the country team; HN government officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian organizations; and international public and private groups.

s. **Training and readiness requirements** of JTF-CM/CBRNE response capability. The CCDR can enhance readiness by pre-identifying the headquarters which will serve as his/her JTF-CM and monitoring availability and readiness of CBRN response capable forces within the AOR.

5. Foreign Consequence Management Phases

FCM will be composed of five phases that will be scoped by tasks to be accomplished. The phases, while sequential, may overlap in execution.

a. **Phase I (Alert, Situation Assessment, and Preparation).** Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRNE situation, preparation for deployment, and the deployment of selected advance elements. The GCC, in coordination with the COM, may deploy in-theater CBRNE assessment, detection, and identification survey teams as required. Phase I ends when the nature and scope of the CBRNE situation and initial response force requirements are defined.

b. **Phase II (Deployment).** Phase II begins with the SecDef-approved Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment and/or execute order designating the intermediate and/or forward staging bases, and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting commanders). The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II ends when all forces have completed movement to the designated incident location and supporting locations.

c. **Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities).** Phase III begins with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting locations, and ends with the determination that DOD support is no longer required. Commanders begin planning immediately for transition to HN and civilian agencies, and should identify the necessary or minimum conditions to initiate transition to other agencies.

d. **Phase IV (Transition to HN and/or Other Agencies).** Although planning for transition of CBRNE CM begins as soon as practical following the initial response, Phase IV begins with the formal implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by DOD.

e. **Phase V (Redeployment).** Phase V begins with the redeployment of US military forces involved in the FCM operations, and is complete when all forces have returned to their previous military posture.

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CHAPTER IV PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

“A Good Plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan executed tomorrow.”

George S. Patton

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

An assessment of the chemical warfare agent will indicate key information that will impact force protection measures and decisions. The assessment information will provide feedback such as protection requirements, hazard levels, areas of contamination, expected duration of hazards, etc. This information will contribute to the commander’s situational awareness, and the commander will continue to use the technical assessment capability that will be part of any response capability involving CBRNE CM. The primary goals of CBRNE CM are to save lives; prevent injury; provide temporary critical life support; protect critical infrastructure, property, and the environment; contain the event; and preserve national security. In addition, it is advantageous to respond in such a manner that the minimal impact of the event serves as a deterrent for future domestic and international terrorist attacks. Every incident will be different, but the underlying concepts will remain constant. A robust CBRNE CM program serves as a deterrent against future CBRNE use. The focus of CBRNE CM operations is the consequences produced by the incident. While this chapter focuses primarily on domestic CBRNE CM, the planning considerations may be applicable for the varied environments associated with FCM. For further specific planning guidance for FCM refer to Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management.” The following items should be considered during the CBRNE CM planning process.

a. Assess

(1) After a CBRNE incident, parallel assessment processes occur at the field level by local responders; at the regional level by the ERT-A; and at the national level by the NOC and IAC. These assessments determine the scope and magnitude of the incident, and will ultimately determine the need for DOD and joint force participation. Planners and assessors must remember that any assessments must be done as quickly as possible since time delays in responding will result in additional lives lost.

(2) The CCDR will, in coordination with Federal and state authorities (usually the COM or state adjutant general), send an assessment element to gain early situational awareness and conduct assessments in response to a CBRNE situation. The senior individual of the

assessment element serves as the CCDR's liaison officer to gain on-scene situational awareness and provide recommendations on the appropriate level of C2 and initial resources required for the CBRNE incident response. The assessment element may include a staff judge advocate, chemical, medical, public affairs, operations, plans, logistics, law enforcement, and communications officers and selected subject matter experts to assist in developing the assessment and recommending an appropriate response. USNORTHCOM's standing CBRNE CM joint task force, JTF-CS, trains and prepares for this mission by maintaining an on-call command assessment element (CAE) capability. Other CCDRs have standing site assessment teams or survey and assessment teams prepared for this mission.

(3) Because the vast majority of DSCA falls under USNORTHCOM, the JTF-CS CAE procedures are included here as an example of assessment processes and actions. Following coordination with state civil and military officials (typically the state adjutant general) and Federal officials (to include the FCO, the ERT-A, the DCO and other on-scene technical advisors), the CAE makes an evaluation of potential shortfalls in Federal and state capabilities, which may become requests for DOD assistance. The CAE prepares its assessment shaped by its knowledge of CBRNE effects, the harm or damage they may cause, and how to mitigate and manage the resulting consequences. The assessment identifies proposed methods of response, anticipated actions, and potentially required forces. Information gathered by the CAE is developed, either independently or through the support of an appropriate joint planning group for CAP, into a commander's assessment using the JOPES format for a commander's estimate and forwarded to the CCDR. This document provides specific recommendations to the CCDR relative to the CBRNE response effort, to include tailoring and supplementing the CBRNE CM response force structure required. The assessment helps the CCDR conduct the mission analysis and prepare the commander's estimate with a recommended DOD COA to be taken in support of the event and recommended DOD resources and capabilities for anticipated mission assignments. The commander's estimate identifies force to task capabilities required to accomplish anticipated catastrophic event DOD mission assignments. With SecDef approval, and through CJCS direction, these capabilities are resourced by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) (in its role as the global primary joint force provider), the Military Services, other CCDRs, and the DOD agencies (as supporting organizations to CJCS CONPLAN 0500.) The CJCS EXORD identifies the designated forces provided to the CCDR and specifies the type of command authority (normally OPCON). Additionally, it provides approval of purpose, desired effect, and COA to be taken in support of Federal agencies for this CBRNE situation.

(4) Specific assessment items are provided below:

(a) **Damage and Injury Reports.** Examine damage and injury reports for information on specific CBRNE effects. Specific events/incidents should include the control of contamination, and should include contaminated casualties. CBRNE devices or vectors each present unique characteristics that must be analyzed to plan and provide appropriate response measures.

(b) **Nature of the Incident.** Examine the effect on the population and infrastructure to identify response capabilities required to address the incident. This includes assessing risk to responders in order to determine force protection requirements.

(c) **Force Protection (FP).** Ensure FP is planned for and implemented. A top priority during CBRNE CM operations, FP considerations include providing proper protective equipment to personnel, planning for site safety, security, individual awareness of hazards and dangers, protection from contamination through proper marking and avoidance of contaminated areas, and proper preventive medicine and mental health care.

(d) **Duration and Geographical Extent of the Incident.** Assess the number of jurisdictions affected by the incident and the likelihood of the scope expanding significantly.

(e) **Weather and Terrain.** Examine the effect weather and terrain may have on the CBRNE material to include dispersion of chemical, biological, radiological agents or toxic material by wind.

(f) **Public Reaction.** Gauge public reaction to the incident as it can affect response requirements, particularly if the level of fear is high or likely to grow, or if massive population movement is underway or expected.

(g) **Mission Duration.** Assess mission duration, as it will drive sustainment requirements. Extenuating circumstances may prolong CBRNE CM operations in the event civilian capability is lacking or inadequate. However, transition back to local responders should occur as soon as is practical.

(h) **CBRNE Reconnaissance Measures.** Plan for the conduct of sampling, surveying, and surveillance. Military forces generally have only basic sampling and detection capabilities, so specialized military units may be required.

(i) **Identification of Supporting DOD Forces.** Local authorities may have some DOD forces assisting within their area under immediate response authority. Work through the Services to identify Title 10 units that are providing support either under immediate response or under local authority prior to the EXORD and JTF establishment. Once the JTF is established, understanding capabilities of forces currently operating within the JOA will support the JTF commander with C2 and will also eliminate duplication of capabilities required for DOD support.

b. Coordinate Operations

(1) **Interagency Coordination.** Liaise and coordinate with other agencies and civil authorities. Interagency coordination is a continuous process that should be established and emphasized prior to an event occurring, as well as during and after an event happens. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR's joint interagency coordination group or other means such as an interagency planning cell or group at the combatant command or JTF levels, the importance of interagency

coordination in the planning process cannot be overstated. In particular, ensure public affairs support, information management, and dissemination is in concert with that of DHS or the COM and HN. Ensure compliance with Appendix R of the NRP, “Compendium of National/International Interagency Plans.” Reference JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, for a detailed discussion/reference on interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination during joint operations.

(2) **State and Local Capabilities.** Determine if specialized state or local assets are available to address the incident. The state civil-support team and state HAZMAT coordinator has coordination with state assets and may advise on specialized response assets, and even private resources (such as industrial resources) available for response. Attempt to determine response capability gaps and seams that will require filling by DOD resources or capabilities, i.e., equipment, material, or personnel.

(3) **Federal Coordination.** The CCDR and staff will coordinate through the DHS for national incidents and DOS for incidents involving foreign nations. These contacts should be verified with every training event.

(4) **Communications.** Determine if communication infrastructure is intact. If not, or if it is overwhelmed, specialized communications equipment may be needed for connectivity and interoperability with other agencies. This is particularly important in a nuclear incident with resulting EMP. It should be anticipated that normal civilian communications means (i.e., land-line, cell phone, internet) will be greatly affected and should not be considered as primary means of communications during a catastrophic event.

(5) **Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Technical Support.** Consider the potential for secondary devices designed to explode or release toxic material after emergency response personnel have arrived. Ensure reachback is possible for weapon disposition or other technical expertise.

(6) **Occupational and Public Health.** Identify a lead medical/health DOD agency / liaison to provide support and recommendations regarding personnel and public health and safety including cleanup levels and risk assessments. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CDC, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration may provide recommendations to the DOD regarding health, safety, and cleanup levels.

(7) **Evidentiary Requirements.** Where exclusive Federal jurisdiction applies, coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to determine evidence collection procedures in case the incident is a criminal or terrorist act.

(8) **Transition and Disengagement.** Plan for the termination of military support. This is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed planning. DOD will typically disengage from operations when the local authorities are capable of assuming the responsibilities for the response operations. This is generally when the immediate danger from the CBRNE event is

eliminated, the capabilities to save lives are in place, and critical services are restored. DOD will generally not remain to conduct site recovery operations.

(9) **Legal Requirements.** In both national and foreign CBRNE CM, unique legal requirements may exist. Legal review by the assigned judge advocate should occur as the event unfolds to ensure compliance with any such requirements.

c. **Conduct Logistics.** Providing logistic support for CBRNE CM produces challenges not encountered with other types of joint operations. There may be a high sense of urgency, especially if the US has been attacked. The force is task-organized depending on the mission and requires transportation, billeting, messing, and other life support services. The force may deploy with significant assets and specialized equipment that will be determined by the mission, situation, and the designated response force. The size of the force may range from a detachment to a brigade sized unit. This is the most complicated DOD civil support response option. Multi-Service forces originate from diverse locations and converge at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD)/BSI to be integrated under a common commander. The nature of this deployment requires detailed planning and significant JRSOI support to receive, organize, and stage the forces for follow-on operations. Plans should allow forces to rapidly deploy, conduct JRSOI and successfully execute their mission immediately after a CBRNE incident has occurred. The responsiveness of support forces will not only impact the success of the mission but also impact the trust of the population affected by the CBRNE incident.

(1) **Response Time.** Time sensitivity for DOD response may vary depending upon the severity and type of event and may determine the need for a particular mode of transportation. Procedures for the development of time-phased force and deployment data and for the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces within the context of JOPES are found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 series of manuals.

(2) Logistic support in domestic CBRNE CM is similar to logistic support for foreign humanitarian assistance, with some unique considerations in medical support, mortuary affairs, and populace displacement under CBRNE conditions.

For more information see JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) Although logistic elements may precede other joint forces, it is very likely that local and state government agencies, to include the NG, will have already responded to the CBRNE incident as mandated by the NRP and local and state contingency plans. Therefore, as part of their mission analysis, logistic planners should assess the capability and availability of the local and state assets and local military installations.

For more information on general logistic planning and support, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

(4) **Deployment and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.** CRBNE response units, with direction from the parent unit and Service, are responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment activities, movement to and activities at ports of embarkation, and arrival at ports of debarkation (PODs). The designated JTF, in coordination with the designated BSI commander and JFO, will coordinate activities for JRSOI activities. Depending on the situation, JRSOI of incoming Title 10 forces may not be tied to the BSI or a designated installation. It may have to be conducted through an abbreviated method of capturing personnel and equipment status without requiring the traditional deliberate JRSOI model.

For other deployment and redeployment operations, see JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(5) **Base Support Installation.** A BSI is a military installation within the US, its territories, or possessions controlled by any Service or agency, in or near an actual or projected domestic emergency operational area, designated by the DOD to provide military support for DOD and Federal agency disaster response operation efforts. See Appendix C, “Base Support Installation Considerations,” for more information on BSI planning considerations.

(a) Resources provided by a designated BSI may include, but are not limited to: marshalling and lay down areas, security forces, personnel and equipment reception/staging areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling equipment, maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, communications support, and medical services.

(b) Logistic planners should consider appropriate Service and RC installations as potential BSIs that will facilitate JRSOI and sustainment of CBRNE CM capable units. Although the Services, when directed by SecDef, will designate the appropriate BSI, locations for potential BSI should be based on previous site surveys, assessments, and mission analysis. In a foreign country, logistic planners can seek information from the combatant command country books, the country team, and special operations forces, or other military units operating in the operational area to determine BSI options and HN support.

(6) **Transportation.** Plan for critical transportation routes and infrastructure to be disrupted by the incident itself or by secondary effects such as populace movement and emergency response efforts. Identify primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas. The joint force headquarters staff coordinates through the DCO at the JFO with Department of Transportation as the primary agency for ESF 1 regarding movement restriction and transportation safety to determine accessibility and status of the road network, APOD, and sea ports of debarkation (SPODs) within the operational area. The deployment of US forces supporting CBRNE CM will be directed by EXORD.

(a) All transportation modes are considered to support the domestic CBRNE CM response, including organic assets. The deployment of CBRNE CM unit personnel, supplies, and equipment should be phased so as to not overwhelm throughput of PODs, road networks,

and on-site reception and support capabilities. For those units that cannot deploy with organic assets, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) can provide deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land and sea transportation for forces engaged in domestic CBRNE CM response operations. Due to the deleterious effect of aircraft contamination on intertheater operations, operational commanders should consider all measures possible consistent with mission priorities and operational risks to debark uncontaminated or decontaminated cargo, equipment, and personnel at uncontaminated airfields.

For more information on air mobility operations in a CBRNE-contaminated environment, refer to MCM 0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance.

(b) USTRANSCOM also provides aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, and aerial port services to support CBRNE CM operations. However, in a contaminated environment, USTRANSCOM may limit the transportation of contagious and contaminated casualties to no more than 50 and treat patients in place. Logistic planners must be cognizant of the potential issues pertaining to requirements for the staging, reuse, transportation of and/or disposition of decontaminated or residually contaminated equipment used during the CBRNE CM response effort. These issues could significantly slow the normal redeployment process. Planners must also consider the impact of cleanliness policy initiatives involving the transport of contaminated patients/cargo.

For more information on current cleanliness policy, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307 (Attachment 12), Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations, and Standards of Care, and USTRANSCOM policy documents titled, Policy on Contaminated Human Remains, and Chemical Warfare Agent Exposure Planning Guidance.

(7) **Contracting Services.** Critical contracting administration support is essential to expedite the procurement of services and material in support of CBRNE CM operations. Logisticians should be familiar with the services provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency that support the CCDR. When contracting for supply, transportation, and services, logisticians should consider existing contracts already supporting military installations and other Federal agencies in the operational area and contracts available through the state's United States Property and Fiscal Office when applicable.

(8) **Engineer Services.** The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the designated ESF #3 coordinator and a primary agency as directed by the NRP. USACE can provide water, ice, construction materials, and engineer services when activated under ESF#3 and ESF#6. If ESF#3 or ESF#6 have not been activated, the JTF or DCO will request engineering capabilities through the CCDR to the components.

(9) **Mortuary Affairs.** The joint forces may assist Federal agencies by providing assistance in managing human remains, including victim identification and MA. The primary responsibility for responding to MA issues rests with state and local authorities. A local or state medical examiner official will normally have the responsibility for leading the MA response effort. Other important state/local government stakeholders who may have significant operational

involvement include; office of emergency management, department of public health, NG, state law enforcement department of the environment, and the fire department/hazardous materials units. There are several conditions that will shape the ability of the local and state officials to respond to mass fatality operations. Some of these factors include; number of fatalities, quality/state of remains, the agent or agents (contaminated vs. uncontaminated), location and size of search and recovery area, conditions (weather, daylight, terrain), city/state/Federal resources available, DOD resources available, and most importantly public expectations. Within the construct of the civilian operation there are a number of different missions where joint forces may be asked to provide civil support assistance in the area of MA. Expected missions are advisory support, search and recovery, reception, remains storage, remains decontamination, personal effects, photography, fingerprinting, forensic dentistry, forensic pathology, family assistance, administration and logistic support, and remains disposition. For remains that cannot be decontaminated, protecting the health of Service members and the public must take precedence over rapid repatriation. Temporary interment of those contaminated remains that still pose a threat to public health is the recommended method for disposition. A phased plan may be required to assist civil authorities in augmenting medical examiners or coroners. See Figure IV-1 for an example.

For more information on joint mortuary affairs operations, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

(10) **Resupply.** Ensure that critical resupply items are identified and addressed (e.g., self-contained breathing apparatus refills and other CBRNE related consumables).

d. **Health Services Support.** Frequently, the most immediate needs for support to civil authorities will be in the medical area. Providing initial essential stabilizing medical care and forward resuscitative/surgical care are the two essential capabilities that will be required in the first hours following the CBRNE event. DOD may also be required to support medical augmentation to local hospitals, community health (vaccinations, disease investigation, prophylaxis dispensing, preventive medicine and veterinary support), patient movement and distribution/redistribution of patients, medical logistics distribution, and mental health, as well as potentially providing direct medical treatment and patient decontamination. DOD must coordinate health services support with the state health officer through the state's office of emergency preparedness.

(1) **Health Facilities.** Identify the capabilities of the local health facilities to treat and house patients. Identify what special medical support DOD is expected to provide. If this cannot be identified locally, information concerning the ability of local health facilities to treat and house patients should be available from the state's emergency preparedness office.

(2) **At-Risk Population.** Identify the demographics of the population at-risk (elderly, young, pregnant, etc.).

(3) **Medical.** Augment the analysis of available information on epidemiological and diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident to address preventive medicine requirements,

JOINT TASK FORCE MORTUARY AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE PLAN

Joint task force mortuary affairs integrates into local, state, and federal operations to assist and augment the Medical Examiner/Coroner in the following: Search and recovery, staging, storage and decontamination, transportation, in-processing, DNA identification, and disposition.

1. Search & Recovery –

Mortuary Affairs Teams in personal protective equipment go into the contaminated zone recovering remains/personal effects and transport to temporary storage. There may be areas still too contaminated to justify risk.

4. In-Processing –

Personnel could be integrated into morgue operations assisting with initial file creation, fingerprinting, personal effects storage, DNA sampling, general assistance, and administrative support.

2. Staging, Storage & Decontamination –

Remains are stored and brought to the mortuary affairs decontamination control point (MADCP) for decontamination, evaluation and readied for transport to clean storage.

5. DNA Identification –

The Armed Forces Medical Examiners Office could assist in a limited number DNA identification activities.

3. Transportation & Clean Storage –

Decontaminated remains could be moved to long-term storage sites designated by the Medical Examiner.

6. Disposition –

Department of Defense may be asked to assist with disposition of remains.




Figure IV-1. Joint Task Force Mortuary Affairs Response Assistance Plan

laboratory services, and casualty evacuation and treatment conducted by local, state, and Federal public health authorities. If foreign medical support is provided, ensure that operating procedures are provided. Recognize that there are unique issues relating to military medical support to include personnel and supplies.

(4) **Populace Care.** During a CBRNE catastrophic incident, large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing. The JFC may be requested to support short term mass care in meeting basic human needs of food, water, shelter, hygiene, and medical care. DOD may also be requested to provide cots and tents or assist with construction of temporary shelters. Key to planning populace care is determining the transition of responsibilities from DOD to civil authorities in the event that temporary shelters and camps become more permanent.

e. **Contain and Decontaminate.** Tasks may include decontamination of civilian and military personnel as well as civilian and military equipment. Additionally, decontamination of contaminated remains is a viable mission. Local hospital decontamination tasks will also be required. Contaminated waste disposal will be a key requirement, and important in the context of interagency coordination. The EPA will play a significant role as the ESF coordinator and primary agency responsible for hazardous waste. The USCG may also play a significant role as a primary agency for hazardous materials as defined by the NRP and the National Contingency Plan. A DOD medical/health representative with appropriate technical expertise serve as coordinating element for health-based recommendations for health and safety and clean up aspects related to military unique hazards (such as chemical warfare agents).

(1) Site Management

(a) **Containment.** Joint force CBRNE CM response elements provide the capability to reduce or isolate an incident in order to mitigate or prevent further risk or damage to persons, materiel, facilities, and the environment. Contamination-control measures include leaving equipment in a potentially contaminated area until it is tested for contamination by qualified personnel. Other measures could include encapsulating contaminated items by covering the equipment with plastic bags or tarps.

(b) **Detection/Identification.** The CBRNE incident may require forces to detect and identify the specific hazard(s). Forces may also be tasked to survey the contaminated area to determine extent and level/degree of contamination. Survey elements will help ensure that the incident site is treated as a crime scene by setting boundaries and cordoning the site. Hazard areas may need to be marked and isolated to warn and protect the response personnel working in the area. Setting boundaries facilitates strict control into and out of the incident site.

(c) **Security.** The joint force CBRNE CM commander normally will not be authorized to provide or augment local or Federal law enforcement in conducting access control, traffic control, or site security except on Federal installations and facilities. These public safety responsibilities are law enforcement tasks that restrict freedom of movement of civilian population and *Posse Comitatus Act* legal restrictions must be observed for Title 10 forces unless there has

been a Presidential authorization. NG forces in state active duty or Title 32 status do not have these limitations because they conduct operations under the control of the state governor.

See JP 3-26 Homeland Security, for further discussion on this topic.

(d) **Zone Control.** In a CBRNE CM role, joint forces may assist with verification and management of containment boundaries set by civil authorities. Control zones are operational areas established by civil authorities at an incident site within which only specific types of operations are conducted. Personnel working in these areas must adhere to strict procedures to ensure the safety of those working in the zones. Control zones are established to ensure the safety of all responders and control access into and out of a contaminated area. The three zones established at a CBRNE incident site are the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. See Service publications for a complete discussion of zone control.

1. Hot Zone. The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding an incident, which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from the device/agent to personnel outside the zone. The hot zone can also be referred to as the exclusion zone, red zone, or restricted zone and is the primary area of contamination. The hot zone is the area that the incident commander judges to be the most affected by the incident. This includes any area to which the contaminant has spread or is likely to spread. Access is only permitted to personnel who are properly trained and protected. The incident commander sets the perimeters of this zone after giving consideration to the type of agent, the volume released, the means of dissemination, the prevailing meteorological conditions, and the potential of local topographic characteristics to channel agent dispersal. Priorities within the hot zone may include conducting search and rescue, performing mitigation, and identifying CBRNE or other physical obstacles to the entry point. The hot zone is also the location where contamination reduction begins. In the event of a biological attack, continued surveillance of the population, animals, vectors, and the environment should be conducted to mitigate the amplification or spread of the biological agent.

2. Warm Zone. The warm zone can also be referred to as the decontamination zone, contamination-reduction zone, contamination-reduction corridor, yellow zone, or limited access zone. It is the area immediately surrounding the hot zone, which could become contaminated due to ongoing operations. The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold zones where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot-zone support take place. It includes control points for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination. It is an operational area safe from downwind exposure and includes the bulk of the decontamination assets where survey-teams are positioned and equipment decontamination is accomplished. Access control points connecting the warm zone to the hot and cold zones are established. In the event of a biological attack, continued surveillance of the population, animals, vectors and the environment should be conducted to ensure the yellow zone is free of contamination.

3. Cold Zone. The cold zone can also be referred to as the support zone, clear zone, or green zone. It is the area outside the warm zone where there is no contamination present. The cold zone is the area where the incident command post and support functions that

are necessary to control the incident are located. The same basic considerations that are used for the hot and warm zones influence the extent of the cold zone. The cold zone must be readily accessible and provide the means for safety and rest. It must also be large enough to accommodate local, state, and Federal CBRNE response forces (if required) and to serve as the staging area for personnel and equipment. The operational priorities of the cold zone include providing C2 for operations being conducted in the warm and hot zones and ensuring that there is an area of security for emergency personnel and response forces conducting operations.

(e) National defense area (NDA) or national security area (NSA) planning considerations. The DOD response and activity within the boundaries of a NDA or NSA established in the event of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident is not considered DSCA. However CBRNE CM planners must understand this relationship to response activities that would occur in accordance with DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Radiological Accidents*, and DOD 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, in order to plan for DSCA if the effects were not contained within the NDA or NSA.

1. National Defense Area. An area established on non-Federal or non-DOD Federal lands located within the US, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DOD equipment and/or material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such lands under the effective control of DOD and results only from an emergency event. The senior DOD representative at the scene will define the boundary, have the boundary marked with a physical barrier, and have warning signs posted. The landowner's consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.

2. National Security Area. An area established on non-Federal or Federal lands located within the US, its possessions, or territories, for safeguarding classified information, and/or restricted data or equipment and material belonging to DOE or National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Establishment of a NSA temporarily places such lands under the effective control of DOE or NASA and results only from an emergency event. The senior DOE or NASA representative having custody of the material at the scene shall define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible.

3. Off-Site. That area beyond the boundaries of a DOD installation or DOE facility, including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA, that has been, or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident.

4. Off-site authority and responsibility at a nuclear weapon accident rests with state and local officials. It is important to recognize that land placed temporarily under Federal control by the establishment of NDA or NSA to protect USG material or classified property and materials will revert to state control upon disestablishment of the NDA or NSA. The state governor is responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of individuals within the territorial limits of the state during periods of emergency or crisis. The on-scene commander

will assist the state in ensuring that the public is protected. For foreign incidents, the HN retains sovereignty over its soil and the responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

5. C2 on-site at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident rests with the agency in charge of the facility or geographic area where the accident occurs. If the accident occurs outside these boundaries, the Service or agency having custody of the weapon at the time of the accident has C2. If the accident occurs outside the 48 contiguous states, but within US territories, responsibility for directing the US response shall rest with the CCDR in whose AOR the accident occurred. If the accident occurs outside the US or its territories, the CCDR will coordinate with DOS, as appropriate. “On-site” is that area around a nuclear weapon accident under the OPLAN of the installation commander, facility manager, DOD, on-scene commander, DOE team leader (at a DOE accident), or host government official. For accidents/incidents in the US, its territories or possessions, on-site includes any area established as a NDA or NSA. When overseas, this onsite secure area should be defined in the HN agreement and will be referred in this document as a security area. This area, although not equivalent to the NDA or NSA, uses local authorities to restrict people from the immediate area of the accident for their protection and the safeguarding of weapon systems.

6. Civil authorities/officials have primary responsibility for C2 off-site and will request Federal assistance and assets through DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The state coordination officer (SCO) together with the senior FEMA official and the DCO coordinate requests for Federal assistance to ensure that assistance is provided. If an accident/incident involving nuclear weapons results in a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency, Public Law 93-288 (Stafford Act), states the President will appoint a FCO to coordinate the overall Federal response. Policy and doctrine for DSCA would then apply in providing the additional military support (off-site) to the FCO as required, subject to the military missions and priorities of DOD.

(2) **Movement.** Consider requirements to decontaminate personnel, vehicles, and equipment in support of evacuation, redeployment or any movement from a contaminated site. The intent to retrograde residually contaminated equipment must be communicated through the CJCS due to potential risks and political/environmental sensitivities.

(3) **Disposal.** Consider requirements to dispose of unsalvageable equipment and vehicles.

(4) **Monitoring.** Consider requirements to monitor personnel, vehicles, and equipment entering or exiting a contaminated zone.

f. **Safety and Risk Assessment**

(1) **Safety.** Safety must be emphasized during deployment for CBRNE CM operations because they will be directed with little warning and lack of preparation time. Forces may move immediately into employment with little rest and under extremely stressful conditions. Military issue protective equipment may not protect against all CBRN hazards. JTF’s have historically

relied on their components to run their individual Service safety programs because safety expertise resides in the Services. Exposure guidelines, standards and instructions should be set by the JFC. Tracking of exposure and force health protection compliance should be captured, analyzed, and acted upon as a joint safety issue.

(2) **Risk Assessment.** The JFC should employ risk assessment and risk management during CBRNE CM operations as a decision-making process used to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Risk assessment will help identify hazards and then assess those hazards to determine risk. The effect, not the source, of the hazard is what's important. Assessment is usually a mechanical process of assessing the probability of the event or occurrence, estimating the expected result or severity of an event or occurrence, and then determining specified level of risk for a given probability and severity. Matrixes and tables are often used to assist in this process.

(3) **Risk Management.** Risk management entails developing controls and making risk decisions, implementing those controls, and then supervising and evaluating. Maintaining safety discipline is extremely important during CBRNE CM operations. When personnel operate in an area that is not considered a high threat area (such as within the US), there is the risk of losing situational awareness and failing to remain vigilant. The heightened sense of urgency in working to help parents, children and the elderly who have been attacked by a terrorist may impact on decisions and cause Service members to want to take more personal risk. Other examples of long-term hazards include climatic extremes, CBRN and hazardous waste contamination, or disease threats within the particular operational area or indigenous population.

2. International Law, Agreements, and Planning Considerations for North America

a. **Security Cooperation.** Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve US security interests and build defense partnerships. The SecDef identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to enhance effectiveness. Each GCC develops and implements a theater security cooperation (TSC) program and a strategy outlining a concept and approach for planning, executing, and assessing a TSC program. The strategy derives from the National Defense Strategy and the SecDef security cooperation guidance, as well as command mission statements and command objectives. As part of his or her command strategy, CDRUSNORTHCOM establishes partnerships with neighbor nations to integrate capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of disasters and emergencies.

b. Canada – United States (CANUS) Agreements

(1) **Implications.** A number of CANUS agreements and plans exist that provide for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation with respect to assistance to civil authorities. These agreements cover binational planning efforts, the movement

of forces, and other mutual support requirements. Key documents addressing this guidance are contained in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents.”

(2) **Special Considerations.** As in the US domestic environment, the binational environment has special considerations that must be addressed when planning for and executing CBRNE CM operations.

(a) **Sovereignty.** Both governments exercise control of their sovereign territory and command their national forces in accordance with national laws, policies, and directives during CBRNE CM operations.

(b) **Federal Coordination of Emergency Response.** Depending upon the nature, severity and location of the emergency, Canada’s Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the US DHS may communicate to coordinate a binational emergency response plan. Complementing these efforts, Foreign Affairs Canada, acting on behalf of the Government of Canada, and the office of the US Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the USG, will in conjunction with existing consular emergency contingency plans, coordinate a binational response.

(c) **Cross Border Movement of Land Forces.** Approval by the respective governments is required for a Canadian forces (CF) military element to cross into the US or vice versa. Authority for land forces to cross the CANUS border comes from an agreement between Canada and the US on principles and procedures for temporary cross-border movement of land forces.

(d) **Intelligence Collection.** The employment of Canadian and US military intelligence collection assets will be coordinated and conducted in accordance with the national laws and military directives of both countries.

(e) **Military in a Law Enforcement Role.** National defence is a federal competence in accordance with section 91 (7) of the Canadian Constitution. The power to take action must be given by legislation, such as the provisions found in the National Defence Act (Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, Chapter N-5).

(f) **Immediate Response Authority.** Per Standing Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations, CF commanders may take whatever action they consider necessary and reasonable to respond immediately to requests for humanitarian assistance within Canada to save lives and prevent human suffering.

(g) **Guidance for the Use of Force.** Rules of engagement for CF personnel deployed in a civil assistance mission will be requested by the JTF commander and authorized in accordance with B-GG-005-004/AF-005 dated 2001-06-01, Use of Force in CF Operations (Revision 1). Every mission will require unique guidance to deployed forces. Forces providing

binational military support who are deployed cross-border will comply with RUF, use of force, or rules of engagement designated in respective national operation/execute orders.

c. Canada – United States Planning Efforts

(1) **CANUS Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan (JRERP).** After the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania in 1979 and at Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986, Canada and the US recognized the need for cooperation in development of a response plan for radiological events. Consequently, the two countries developed a joint plan to deal effectively with a potential or actual peacetime radiological event that could affect both countries or be of a magnitude that would require assistance from the neighboring country. The CANUS JRERP is currently being rewritten to incorporate the Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. The CANUS JRERP, is designed to do the following:

(a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the existence of a threat from a potential or actual radiological event.

(b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent possible, the threat posed to public health, safety, property, and the environment.

(c) Facilitate coordination between the federal government in each country in providing support to provinces and states affected by a potential or actual radiological event.

(2) **CANUS Civil Assistance Plan.** Under the auspices of the CANUS Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation, a number of planning efforts to address combined defense and civil assistance are underway. These include the Basic Security Document (formerly the Basic Security Plan) and the Combined Defense Plan.

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America. The SPP is a US Presidential initiative with DOD equities. The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers on trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland Security Council are the lead agencies for the agreement's security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan addresses goals and objectives associated with homeland security to include "Protection, Prevention, and Response." One of the goals of the agreement is to "develop and implement a common approach to critical infrastructure protection, response to cross-border terrorist incidents, and as applicable, natural disasters." This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and US/Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and implement joint plans for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training and exercises in emergency response. This includes the development of a plan to build and strengthen mechanisms, protocols, and agreements for communicating and coordinating emergency response for mutual assistance and cooperation in the event of natural and technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives devices and hazards.

APPENDIX A
KEY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND
HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
LEGAL, STRATEGY, AND POLICY DOCUMENTS

1. Legal, National Strategy, and National Policy Guidance

a. **The Constitution.** The Preamble states that two purposes of the Constitution are to insure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense. Furthermore, Congress has the power to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Constitution provides the fundamental justification for HD and CS through the guarantee of domestic tranquility and provision for the common defense of the nation.

b. **Key Executive and Legislative Guidance.** The following documents are key references when addressing the CS mission area, to include CBRNE CM:

(1) **HSPD-1**, *Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council*, established the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all HS-related activities among the executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all HS policies.

(2) **HSPD-3**, *The Homeland Security Advisory System*, provides the guidelines for a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, state and local authorities and the American people. This document establishes the five threat conditions and their respective protective measures.

(3) **HSPD-4/NSPD-17**, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, describes three pillars for our national strategy to combat WMD: counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthen nonproliferation activities to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. Each pillar iterates specific actions to be pursued within the pillar.

(4) **HSPD-5**, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, assigns the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management to coordinate the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. Additionally, HSPD-5 established the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.

(5) **HSPD-8**, *National Preparedness*, establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the US to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing

mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, state, and local entities. This directive is a companion to HSPD-5 which identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents.

(6) **HSPD-9**, *Defense of United States Agriculture and Food*, establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

(7) **HSPD-10**, *Biodefense for the 21st Century*, outlines the essential pillars of our biodefense program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the significant gains put in place during the past three years. These pillars include threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery, which include response planning, mass casualty care, risk communication, medical countermeasures, and decontamination.

(8) **PDD-39**, *US Policy on Counterterrorism*, validates and reaffirms existing Federal lead agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to Department of Justice (DOJ), as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for threats or acts of terrorism within the US. The FBI, as the lead or other primary agency for CrM will involve only those Federal agencies required and designated. The Directive further states that DHS/FEMA, with the support of all agencies in the NRP, will support the FBI until the Attorney General transfers lead agency to DHS/FEMA. DHS/FEMA retains responsibility for CBRNE CM throughout the response. HSPD-5 modified the lead agency relationship identified in PDD-39 by stating that “the United States Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.” PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing federal lead agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to DOJ, as delegated to the FBI, for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. The FBI as the federal agency with lead responsibility for CrM will involve only those federal agencies required and designated. The directive further states that DHS/FEMA with the support of all agencies in the NRP, will support the FBI until the Attorney General transfers lead agency to DHS/FEMA. DHS/FEMA retains responsibility for CM throughout the response.

(9) **PDD-62**, *Combating Terrorism*, created a systematic approach to addressing the terrorist threat by reinforcing the mission of those agencies charged with fighting terrorism. The Directive codified agency activities for apprehension and prosecution of terrorists, increased transportation security, enhanced response capabilities, and increased protection of computer-based systems that lie at the heart of the economy.

(10) **The National Strategy for Homeland Security**. Prepared for the President by the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, organization and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur.

(11) **Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.** Establishes strategic guidance for securing the US from direct attack with an active, layered defense. Expands on the National Defense Strategy by establishing a lead, support and enable construct in organizing DOD objectives. Provides specific objective to support CBRNE CM for CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

(12) **National Defense Strategy (NDS).** NDS establishes and directs how to accomplish broad strategic objectives. Provides homeland defense implementation guidelines.

(13) **The Homeland Security Act of 2002** established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate all Federal HS activities to protect the Nation against threats to the homeland. To better facilitate the overarching HS mission area, Congress established DHS by merging numerous agencies into a single department.

(14) **Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act.** This act enhances domestic security against terrorism. It eases some of the restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the US and affords the US intelligence community greater access to information discovered during a criminal investigation.

(15) **The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, (42 USC 5121 et seq)** provides for assistance by the Federal Government to the states in the event of natural and other disasters and emergencies. It is the primary legal authority for Federal participation in domestic disaster relief. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct Federal agencies, including DOD, to support disaster relief. DOD may be directed to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.

(16) **The Economy Act (Title 31 USC 1535).** The Economy Act authorizes Federal agencies to provide goods or services on a reimbursable basis to other Federal agencies when more specific statutory authority to do so does not exist.

(17) **National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction** states that NBC weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the US and that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. Three principal pillars are: counterproliferation to combat its use, nonproliferation to combat proliferation, and consequence management to respond to its use.

(18) **The National Military Strategy (NMS) to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction** provides comprehensive, coherent guidance needed to execute US military WMD-related nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence-management missions. It also provides strategic guidance for supporting other departments and agencies as directed, at home and abroad.

(19) **National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.** Expands on the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Security Strategy by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the war of ideas, and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. While the national strategy focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the US, this strategy is more proactive and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The direct and continuous action against terrorist groups will disrupt, and over time, degrade and ultimately destroy their capability to attack the US.

(20) **The National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism.** This strategy outlines the effort our nation is making to win the war against global terror. This document elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen security at home and abroad. Unlike the National Strategy for Homeland Security that focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the United States. In that sense, although it has defensive elements, this strategy is an offensive strategy to complement the defensive National Strategy for Homeland Security.

(21) **Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385).** This Federal statute places strict limits on the use of military personnel for law enforcement. Enacted in 1878, the PCA generally prohibits the use of the US Army (and later, the US Air Force) for civilian law enforcement duties, except as authorized by the US Constitution, or statute. Although the PCA, by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the Act to US Navy and Marine Corps forces, as well. Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, “stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, sets forth several forms of military assistance to civilian authorities, which are allowed under the PCA. Further, in extreme situations, such as in some CBRNE CM operations or upon declaration under the Insurrection Statutes, there is statutory authorization for Federal forces to be used in certain law enforcement activities. CJCSI concerning CBRNE events presumes this will not be the case. However, this could change under the direction of proper authority if the circumstances dictate.

(22) **Title 10 USC (Armed Forces).** Title 10 provides guidance on the US Armed Forces. Guidance is divided into 5 subtitles. One on general military law and one each for the US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force and the Reserve Components. Chapter 18 (sections 371-382) of Title 10 is entitled and governs Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Title 10 USC 375 directs SecDef to promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.”

(23) **Title 14, USC**, sections 2, 19, 89, 141, and 143 define the statutory authority of the USCG during HS missions.

(24) **Title 32 USC, National Guard**. Specifically, statutes in Title 32 USC authorize the use of Federal funds to train NG members while they remain under the C2 of their respective state governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or Presidential authority allows for those forces to perform operational missions funded by the Federal Government, while they remain under the control of the governor. Examples of those exceptions include the employment of WMD-CSTs, civil defense missions, and the President of the United States-directed airport security mission.

(25) **The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS)**. The NSS establishes broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests in the global environment through the instruments of national power. The NMS, derived from the NSS, focuses on how the Armed Forces of the United States will be employed to accomplish national strategic objective. The NSS and the NMS continue to reflect the first and fundamental commitment to defend the Nation against its adversaries.

(26) **4 Mar 2003, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing**. This agreement provides a framework and guidance to govern information sharing, use, and handling among the following individuals and their agencies: Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and any other organization having Federal law enforcement responsibilities (other than those that are part of the DHS). The agreement mandates minimum requirements for information sharing, use, and handling and for coordination and deconfliction of analytic judgments.

c. **Key DOD Guidance**. The following discussion identifies a number of key documents to make commanders and planners more aware of material that may assist in the planning and execution of the CS mission areas.

(1) **Unified Command Plan (UCP)**. The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical AORs for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.

(2) **Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)**. The SPG provides direction for DOD components to develop the Future Years Defense Program and the President's budget submission. The four defense policy goals are to assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat. The goals are articulated in a planning construct of deterring forward and winning decisively while defending at home. The SPG additionally lists the priorities of SecDef: winning the Global War on Terrorism, strengthening combined/joint warfighting capabilities, transforming the joint force, optimizing intelligence capabilities, counterproliferation, improving force manning, developing and implementing new concepts for global engagement, strengthening our ability to fulfill our responsibilities in HS, streamlining DOD processes, and reorganizing DOD and the USG to deal with prewar opportunities and postwar responsibilities.

(3) **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).** The CPG reflects SecDef’s written policy guidance to the CJCS for contingency planning. It is issued with the approval of the President after consultation with the CJCS, provides the focus for the guidance in the NSS and SPG, and is the principal source document for CJCSI 3110.01, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

(4) **The National Military Strategy of the United States of America.** The strategy states “consequence management capabilities are essential in the aftermath of an attack, especially an attack with WMD.”

(5) **The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.** The strategy qualifies WMD CM as “those actions taken to reduce the effects of a WMD attack or event, including TIC and TIM, and assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at home and abroad.”

(6) **DODI 2000.21, *Foreign Consequence Management*.** This document establishes policy and assigns responsibility for DOD support to USG FCM operations in response to a foreign chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident.

(7) **DODD 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism Program*.** This directive updates policies and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for the DOD antiterrorism (AT) program. It establishes CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to SecDef for DOD AT issues. It also defines the AT responsibilities of the Military Departments, commanders of combatant commands, defense agencies, and DOD field activities. Its guidelines are applicable for the physical security of all DOD activities both overseas and in the homeland.

(8) **DOD O-2000.12-P, *Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan*.** This plan guides the DOD’s AT program efforts by articulating strategic goals, objectives, and a proposed strategy for achievement. This plan serves as strategic guidance for all DOD component AT programs.

(9) **DODD 2000.15, *Support to Special Events*.** DODD 2000.15 provides definitions for a special event and support and outlines policy guidelines and responsibilities for DOD support of special events. It allows for the DOD component to designate a special events coordinator who is charged with providing timely information and technical support to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

(10) **DODD 2060.2, *Department of Defense (DOD) Combating WMD Policy*.** This directive identifies WMD Consequence Management as one of eight mission area that guide DOD efforts to combat WMD.

(11) **The DODD 3025 series of directives, instructions and manuals** provide policy on and responsibilities for CS activities. As a result of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the Federal government changed how it supports state, local and tribal authorities in responding to incidents and events. In conjunction with the changes to the Federal response DOD modified how it supports the Federal response. The new DOD policies and procedures are

found in the DODD 3025, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, which establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for providing DSCA, DODI 3025, *Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, which establishes DOD procedures for the internal DOD processing of requests for DSCA and DOD Manual 3025, *Manual for Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, which establishes a single comprehensive system and terminology for DOD to plan for, and respond to, approved requests from civil authorities. The Manual prescribes procedures, and provides guidance by which the DOD provides support in response to a valid request from civil authorities or other authorized requesting agency to prepare, prevent, protect, respond and recover from domestic incidents including terrorist attacks, major disasters, and domestic special events.

(12) **DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities***. DODD 3025.1 provides guidance on CS activities for disaster-related civil emergencies. The lead or other primary agency may request DOD assistance for CS missions. All requests for DOD assistance enter through the Executive Secretary. When imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action, local military commanders and responsible officials of the DOD components may take such actions as may be necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

(13) **DODD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances***. DODD 3025.12 provides guidance on CS activities for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including response to terrorist incidents, and covers the policy and procedures whereby the President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the US to employ the Armed Forces to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government and the DOD for civil disturbances are important due to the potential severity of the consequences of such events for the Nation and the population.

(14) **DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)***. This directive governs all DOD MACA, including support in connection with incidents involving an act or threat of terrorism. The employment of US military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must be requested by the Attorney General and authorized by the President.

(15) **DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Radiological Accidents***. This directive promulgates DOD policy and planning guidance to implement the FEMA Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which has been superseded by the NRP.

(16) **DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense***. This directive establishes the Defense Investigative Program general policy, limitations, procedures, and operational guidance pertaining to the collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating of information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense.

(17) **DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials***. This directive assigns responsibilities and provides policy and procedures to be followed with respect to support provided to Federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts.

(18) **DODI 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines***. This instruction implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to establish and implement a program for a worldwide DOD installation emergency response to manage the consequences of a CBRNE incident. It provides guidance for the establishment of a CBRNE preparedness program for emergency responders at all DOD installations. DOD installation emergency responders must be prepared to respond to the effects of a CBRNE incident to preserve life, prevent human suffering, mitigate the incident and protect critical assets and infrastructure.

(19) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation***. This plan provides SecDef with a wide range of military options to assist in the domestic CBRNE CM operations in response to a CBRNE incident. It also informs GCCs of the full range of their CBRNE CM responsibilities and it provides information and guidance for the conduct of domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(20) **CJCSI 3110.16, *Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations***. This instruction identifies and describes specific military capabilities, assets, and units potentially available to support military CBRNE CM operations in response to CBRNE incidents. Although an actual CBRNE incident would involve a large array of DOD assets, this instruction primarily focuses on CBRNE CM technical support and capabilities that are not generally found throughout the force. This instruction lists selected CBRNE-CM capabilities, assets, and units by Service.

(21) **CJCSI 3121.01B *Standing Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces***. This instruction provides the standing rules for the use of force to be employed by US forces performing DSCA missions.

(22) **CJCSI 3125.01B, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Incidents***. This instruction provides operational and policy guidance and instructions for US military forces supporting domestic CBRNE CM operations in preparation for responding to a CBRNE situation. This instruction only applies to domestic CBRNE CM operations. This instruction is of specific importance to the geographic combatant commands with domestic CBRNE responsibilities. It identifies that domestic CBRNE CM support encompasses both deliberate and inadvertent CBRNE situations including terrorism, acts of aggression, industrial accidents, and acts of nature. It recognizes that domestic CBRNE CM may be conducted by US military forces under immediate response authority and in support of the designated LFA. This CJCSI establishes the charter for CJCS CONPLAN 0500, describing operational and policy guidance to facilitate a rapid DOD response for a potential or actual domestic CBRNE CM situation and provides information to the Federal departments and agencies, DOD, and CJCS operational and policy guidance to the combatant commanders and Services concerning DOD support to the LFA during a domestic CBRNE CM situation.

(23) **CJCSI 3214.01A, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations***. This instruction provides guidance for US military forces supporting USG-led FCM operations in response to a CBRNE situation.

(24) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 8099, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction***. This plan provides the SecDef with a strategic planning framework for global combating weapons of mass destruction campaign. Links strategy to tasks.

2. Key International Legal Documents

a. Canadian Legislation

(1) **Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement)**. The Emergencies Act is contingency legislation that is invoked when specific emergency conditions are met. Following a catastrophic event and a Province request for federal assistance, the Canadian Federal Government may declare a public welfare emergency under the Emergencies Act. For the purposes of the Act, a national emergency is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

(2) **Emergency Preparedness Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th Supplement)**. The Emergency Preparedness Act is federal legislation that establishes emergency preparedness as a required activity of the federal government; charges all Ministers of the Crown with the identification of potential emergencies within their departments; and requires all Ministers to develop and test appropriate emergency plans.

b. CANUS Agreements

(1) **Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) Agreement**. The CANUS ILOC agreement facilitates cooperation in training and operations and provides for reciprocal logistical support, supplies and/or services in nonroutine situations.

(2) **Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation**. Under this agreement, both countries work together on contingency plans for defending against, and responding to possible threats in Canada and the US including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.

(3) **Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States and Canada Agreement**. This Agreement provides principles and procedures for temporary cross-border movement of land forces between the two nations.

(4) **Canadian-United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements**. Emergency management officials in Canada and the US have regional, mutual assistance agreements to

manage emergencies or disasters when the affected jurisdiction(s) requests assistance in response to natural disasters, technological hazards, manmade disasters, and civil emergencies. These agreements are compliant with the *Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive Emergency Planning and Management*. These agreements promote unity of effort with civil authorities in planning and executing military support to civil authorities. Three regional agreements implement regional emergency management mutual assistance covering specific states and provinces:

- (a) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement.
- (b) Prairie Region Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
- (c) International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of Understanding.

(5) **JRERP.** The CANUS JRERP establishes the basis for cooperative measures to deal effectively with a potential or actual peacetime radiological event involving Canada, the United States, or both countries. The JRERP will apply whenever a potential or actual radiological event occurs that can affect both countries or, although affecting one country, is of a magnitude that the affected country may need to request assistance from the other. The JRERP is designed to:

- (a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the existence of a threat from a potential or actual radiological event.
- (b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent possible, the threat posed to public health and safety, property, and the environment.
- (c) Facilitate coordination between organizations of the federal government of each country in providing support to states and provinces affected by a potential or actual radiological event.

(6) **Inland Pollution Contingency Plan.** June 1998. The US Environmental Protection Agency and Environment Canada recognize that there is a high probability that there will be a spill or other release of oil or hazardous materials along the common border between Canada and the US. The CANUS Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan provides for cooperative measures for dealing with accidental and unauthorized releases of pollutants that cause or may cause damage to the environment along the shared inland boundary and that may constitute a threat to the public health, property, or welfare. The Inland Plan is made up of five regional Annexes or regional plans.

c. Military Agreements

(1) **Combined Defense Plan (Draft).** The Combined Defense Plan is an authoritative document that facilitates the military defense of the CANUS Region across multiple domains by

Canada and the US to defeat threats and aggression. The goal of the Combined Defense Plan is to speed the Decision-to-Action time.

(2) **Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAG).** The Armies of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Canadian Forces have agreed to adopt standard operational concepts in various QSTAG agreements. The armies further agreed to consult and wherever possible, reach mutual agreement, before introducing changes to these agreements.

(3) **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAGs).** STANAGs are promulgated by the Director NATO Standardization Agency. No departure may be made from these agreements without informing the tasking authority in the form of a reservation at the time of ratification. Ratifying nations have agreed that national orders, manuals and instructions implementing these STANAGs will be developed. The aim of these agreements is to provide guidelines to commanders about operational issues. Participating nations agree that NATO armed forces will adopt the standards outlined in each agreement.

d. **Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.** The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers to trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland Security Council are the lead agencies for the agreement's security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan addresses goals and objectives associated with homeland security to include "Protection, Prevention, and Response." This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and US/Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and implement joint plans for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training and exercises in emergency response. This includes the development of a plan to build and strengthen mechanisms, protocols, and agreements for communicating and coordinating emergency response for mutual assistance and cooperation in the event of natural and technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving CBRNE devices and hazards.

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APPENDIX B
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

1. General

The role and responsibilities of DOD in a CBRNE CM incident are identified in the NRP ESF and incident annexes. This appendix aligns those identified DOD responsibilities associated with tasks from CJCSM 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* and to the Department of Homeland Security's Universal Task List. While ESFs contained within the NRP are written for a domestic incident, these responsibilities are applicable and adaptable to foreign responses. *Refer to DTRA's Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing and Center for Special Weapons Effects, NBC Threats, Technology Transfers and Resources unclassified web site or classified web site for further information.* Access on the unclassified network can be requested through the DTRA Operations Center or opsentr1@dtra.mil.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS			
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) #1 - Transportation (Department of Transportation)			
Department of Defense (DOD) Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide staffing to National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and regional response coordination center (RRCC)	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ USAF/ USTRANSCOM/ DLA	SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/ Government-wide support SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management SN 9.2.3 Provide Nonproliferation Support OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA	NS 2.2 - Develop plans, procedures, and protocols describing how personnel, equipment, and other governmental and nongovernmental resources will support incident management requirements NS 4.2 - Activate Incident Command System NS 4.5 - Provide for Liaison Support NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide transportation support NS 5.6 - Provide logistics management (resource) support
Assist in restoring transportation infrastructure	USACE	SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/Government-wide support SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management	NS 2.1 Provide for protection of national infrastructure NS 2.2 - Develop plans, procedures, and protocols describing how personnel, equipment, and other governmental and nongovernmental resources will support incident management requirements NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide transportation support NS 5.3 - Provide engineering and other support for structures, public works and infrastructure systems
Provide military transportation capacity	USTRANSCOM	SN 1.1 - Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources SN 1.2 - Conduct Deployment and Redeployment SN 6.6 - Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/ Government-wide support SN 9.2 - Deter by Denial OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide transportation support NS 5.6 - Provide logistics management (resource) support

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #1 - Transportation (Department of Transportation) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Assist in contracting civilian airlift	USTRANSCOM/ DCMA	SN 1.1 - Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources SN 1.2 - Conduct Deployment and Redeployment SN 6.6 - Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/ Government-wide support SN 9.2 - Deter by Denial OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide transportation support NS 5.6 - Provide logistics management (resource) support
Provide support in emergency operation and restoration of inland waterways, ports, and harbors, including dredging operations	USACE	SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/ Government-wide support SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management	NS 2.1 Provide for protection of national infrastructure NS 2.2 - Develop plans, procedures, and protocols describing how personnel, equipment, and other governmental and nongovernmental resources will support incident management requirements NS 4.2 - Activate Incident Command System NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide transportation support NS 5.3 - Provide engineering and other support for structures, public works and infrastructure systems

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #2 - Communications (Department of Homeland Security)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
No DOD specific tasking in Aug 04 draft ESF annex	DIA	SN 2.5 - Disseminate and integrate national strategic intelligence SN 3.5 - Provide space capabilities SN 5.1 - Operate and manage global strategic communications and information systems SN 8.1 - Support other nations or groups SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/ government-wide support SN 9.2 - Deter by denial	NS 1.5 - Disseminate timely and accurate national strategic and threat intelligence consistent with security clearances as appropriate NS 2.1 - Provide for the protection of national infrastructure NS 4.1 - Develop plans, procedures and policies for coordinating, managing and disseminating public information NS 4.4 Alert appropriate national-level organizations of incidents of national significance NS 5.2 - Provide telecommunication and information technology support to Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal officials and private sector NS 7 - Provide national communications and information management support
	USNORTHCOM/ USACE/ USPACOM	SN 3.6 Conduct Survivable Mobile Command Center (SMCC) Operations and Planning Functions (See: SN 3.6.4, SN 3.6.5, SN 3.6.6) OP 4.7.2 Conduct Civil Military Operations in the Operations Joint Area OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	PCS 4.2 Activate regional and State incident command system (See: PCS 4.2.1; PCS 4.2.2; PCS 4.2.5; PCS 4.2.6; PCS 4.2.10) PCS 4.3 Provide State and regional direction, information, and support as appropriate to incident command (IC) or unified command (UC) (See PCS 4.3.1; PCS 4.3.2)

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering (USACE)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
No DOD specific tasking in Aug 04 draft ESF annex	USACE *	OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA SN 5.7 Manage DOD Resource SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action	IM 3 - Manage/direct Public works and engineering IPR 3 - Conduct building department, public works and engineering
NOTE: The USACE is the primary agency for providing technical assistance, engineering, construction management resources and support during response activities. *USACE is acting in its civil sector role(s) under public law and not under DOD funding. USACE authority is derived from the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act (P.L. 84-99) and the Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L.93-288).			
ESF #4 - Firefighting (USDA/USFS)			
Assume full responsibility for firefighting activities on DOD installations	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	IM 4 - Coordinate Firefighting Operations IPR 4 - Conduct Firefighting NS 5.4 Provide firefighting support for incident of national significance
Support firefighting operations on non-military lands	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	PCS 5.5 Coordinate firefighting support for response of national, regional or State significance
Provide contracting services through USACE to obtain heavy equipment and/or demolition services for urban and rural firefighting forces.	DCMA/ USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ USACE	SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action	NS 5.3 Provide engineering and other support for structures, public works and infrastructure systems (See NS 5.3.4, NS 5.3.5, NS 5.3.12) NS 6.5 Build Critical Infrastructure Protection Requirements in Contract Processes and Procedures PCS 5.4 Coordinate Building Department, Public Works and Engineering Support for Response of National, Regional and State Significance (See PCS 5.4.9, PCS 5.4.13, PCS 5.4.14) PCS 5.5 Coordinate Firefighter Support for Response of National, Regional and State Significance IM 4.4 Identify Fire Suppression Resources (See IM 4.4.4) IM 7.2 Provide Logistics Management (See IM 7.2.4.4)

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #5 - Emergency Management (DHS/FEMA)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Identify staff liaisons, POCs, SMEs	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 8.2.4 Assist Civil Defense SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities within the Interagency Process (See SN 8.3.3) SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management ST 4.2 Coordinate Support for Forces in Theater (See ST 4.2.2.2, ST 4.2.5) ST 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Theater Forces (See ST 5.4.3.1, ST 5.4.3.3) ST 8.2 Provide Support to Allies, Regional Governments, International Organizations or Groups (See ST 8.2.2, ST 8.2.3) ST 8.5 Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities (See ST 8.5.1, ST 8.5.3) ST 9.5 Coordinate CM in Theater OP 4.7 Provide Politico-Military Support to Other Nations, Groups, and Government Agencies (See OP 4.7.2, OP 4.7.5, OP 4.7.6) OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and Operate a JF HQ (See OP 5.5.2, OP 5.7.4)	NS 4.5 Provide for Liaison Support PCS 4.5 Provide for Regional and State Liaison Support
ESF #6- Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (DHS/FEMA)			
Provide ice and water	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.1 Integrate Supply and Services ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	IPR 6.4 Provide Emergency Food, Water, Clothing

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #6- Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide assistance in mass care shelter site inspections	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support (See SN 8.2.2, SN 8.2.4) ST 8.4 Provide Theater Support to Other DOD and Government Agencies OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	IM 6 Coordinate Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services IPR 6 Provide Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services NS 5.5 Provide Mass Care, Housing, Human Services Support and security (See NS 5.5.3) PCS 5.7 Coordinate Mass Care, Housing, Shelter, and Human Services Support for Response of National, Regional and State Significance (See 5.7.2)
Provide temporary housing support	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	OP 1.5.5 Assist HN in Populace and Resource Control	IM 6 Coordinate Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services IPR 6 Provide Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services NS 5.5 Provide Mass Care, Housing, Human Services Support and security (See NS 5.5.3) PCS 5.7 Coordinate Mass Care, Housing, Shelter, and Human Services Support for Response of National, Regional and State Significance (See 5.7.2)
ESF #7 - Resource Support (GSA)			
No DOD specific tasking in Aug 04 draft ESF annex	DLA/ USPACOM/ USNORTHCOM	OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA SN 5.7 Manage DOD Resources	IM 7 Coordinate Resource Support IPR 7 Provide Resource Support NS 6 Manage National Resources

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Alerts DOD NDMS Federal Coordinating Centers (FCC) and provides reporting/regulating instructions to support incident relief efforts.	JCS	SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issue Presidential and/or Secretary of Defense/CJSC Orders SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management	NS 4.4 Alert Appropriate National-Level Organizations of Incident of National Significance PCS 4.4 Alert Appropriate National-Level Organizations of Incident of National and regional and State Significance PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.2)
Alerts DOD NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS patient reception plans	JCS	SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issue Presidential and/or Secretary of Defense/CJSC Orders SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management	IM 5.4 Coordinate Jurisdictional Emergency Management Operations
Provide support for the evacuation of seriously ill or injured. Evacuates and manages victims/patients from incident sites to NDMS patient reception areas	USTRANSCOM/ USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient Movement and Evacuation SN 4.3.3 Coordinate Defensewide Health Services SN 9.2.1 Coordinate CBRNE Protection for Strategic Forces and Means ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.1 Coordinate and Provide Transportation Support (See NS 5.1.5) NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.6) PCS 5.2 Coordinate and Provide Regional and State Transportation Support (See PCS 5.2.7, PCS 5.2.7.1, PCS 5.9.10) IM 1.1 Develop Transportation infrastructure incident Response Plan (See IM 1.1.3) IM 10.3 Coordinate and Direct Response to Oil and Hazardous Material Incidents (See IM 10.3.4) IPR 1.1 Activate Approved Traffic Control Plan (See IPR 1.1.1, IPR 1.1.5) IPR 10.3 Respond to Oil and Hazardous Material Incidents (See IPR 10.3.4)

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide logistical support	USNORTHCOM	ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.6 Provide Logistics Management (Resource) Support NS 5.10 Provide Food and Agricultural Support (See NS 5.10.1.5) IM 7.2 Provide Logistics Management IPR 7.1 Provide Logistics Support
Provide medical personnel for casualty clearing/staging	USTRANSCOM/ USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient Movement and Evacuation SN 4.3.3 Coordinate Defensewide Health Services SN 9.2.1 Coordinate CBRNE Protection for Strategic Forces and Means ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate Forces and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed OP 4.4.3.2 Manage Flow of Casualties in the Joint Operations Area	IPR 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and Implement Casualty Management Plan (See IPR 8.1.5)
Provide medical personnel for other missions including aeromedical evacuation and medical treatment	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate Forces and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA	IPR 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and Implement Casualty Management Plan (See IPR 8.1.5)
Mobilize and deploy Reserve and NG medical units	JCS	SN 6.6 Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base	NA

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Coordinates patient reception, tracking, and management to nearby NDMS non-Federal, VA, and DOD medical treatment.	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ USTRANSCOM	SN 6.6.4 Expand Health Service Support ST 9.6 Integrate Theater ISR with the CBRNE Weapons Situation ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support ST 4.2.2.2 Coordinate Patient Evacuation from Theater OP 5.1.4 Maintain Operational Information and Force Status OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health Services in the Joint Operations Area	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.6) PCS 5.9 Coordinate public Health and Medical Service Support including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.10) IM 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and establish Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) as the means to provide direction (See IM 8.1.3.2, IM 8.1.4) IPR 1.2 Provide Transportation/ Personnel Support and Resources (See IPR 1.2.1) IPR 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and Implement Casualty Management Plan
Provides medical personnel to assist HHS in public health protection activities	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 8.2.4 Coordinate Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.9 NS 5.7.14) PCS 3.5 Coordinate Public Health Surveillance and Testing Processes, Immunizations, and Isolation Or Quarantine for Biological Threats PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Service Support, including mental health (See PCS 5.9.5, PCS 5.9.8) IM 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and establish hospital emergency incident command system (HEICS) as the means to provide direction IM 8.2 Develop Public Health and recovery worker Management Guidelines IPR 8.8 Provide for Worker Health and Safety

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provides DOD-reimbursable medical supplies for distribution to mass care and medical care facilities	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ DLA	SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage, and Distribute Funds OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See SN 5.7.5, NS 5.7.17) PCS 5.9 Coordinate public Health and Medical Services Support including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.15)
Provides emergency medical support in disaster area and the surrounding vicinity	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ Installation Commanders	ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 8.2.4 Coordinate Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in JOA	IM 8.1 Conduct situation assessment and establish Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) as the means to provide direction (See IM 8.1.3)
Provides assistance in managing human remains, including victim ID and mortuary affairs.	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.1 Integrate Supply and Services ST 4.3.2 Provide Supplies and Services for Theater Forces OP 4.4.1 Coordinate Field Services Requirements OP 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Mortuary Affairs in the Joint Operations Area	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Service Support (See NS 5.7.10) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support, including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.18) IM 8.1.2.8 Develop Mortuary Plan for Mass Casualties IM 8.5 Conduct epidemiological investigations as surveillance reports warrant and Coordinate Disaster Medical Assistance team (DMAT) assets/Services (See IM 8.5.3) IPR 8.7 Release Remains to Mortuary Services

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide evaluation and risk management support	Combatant Commanders	ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.2) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support, including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.4) IM 5.1 Coordinate Jurisdictional Prevention Programs (See IM 5.1.1.2) IM 10.3 Coordinate and Direct Response to Oil and Hazardous Materials Incidents (See IM 10.3.1) IPR 5.2 Assess Site Impact
Provide blood products	USNORTHCOM/USPACOM	ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support ST 4.2.2.1 Manage Theater Joint Blood Program OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health Services in the Joint Operations Area OP 4.4.3.1 Manage the Joint Blood Program in the Joint Operations Area	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.12) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.20J) IPR 8.14 Conduct Blood Drives
Provide confirmatory laboratory testing	USNORTHCOM/USPACOM	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratories and Supply	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.19) NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety and Security Support (See NS 5.12.8) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support, including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.22) PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and Agricultural Support for Response to Incident of Regional and State Significance (See SN 5.12.6.2) PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public Safety and Security Support (See PRS 5.14.7) IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory and Diagnostic Support, Subject-Matter Expertise, and Technical Assistance

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide US&R JMT fixed and/or rotary-wing transportation	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil Search and Rescue OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in the JOA	NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search and Rescue Support (See NS 5.8.5) IM 9 Coordinate Urban Search and Rescue
Provide US&R JMT ground transportation	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil Search and Rescue OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in the JOA	NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search and Rescue Support (See NS 5.8.5) IM 9 Coordinate Urban Search and Rescue

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provide mobile feeding units for US&R task forces & JMT	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil Search and Rescue OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in the JOA	IM 9.2.6.2 Provide Mobile Feeding Units for Urban Search and Rescue task force
Provide portable shelters for US&R JMTs	USPACOM	SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil Search and Rescue OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence Management in the JOA	IM 9.2.6.1 Provide Portable Shelters for Use by Urban Search and Rescue Task Force
Deploys StS and TSSTs to supplement US&R JMTs	USPACOM/ USACE	SN 8.2 Provide DOD/ Government-Wide Support	NS 5 - Provide National Incident Support
Assist JMT Engineering Cells	USACE	SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action	NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search and Rescue Support (See NS 5.8.6)

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provides structural evaluation and building stability monitoring.	USACE	SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action	NS 3.4 Provide Engineering and Structural guidance (HVAC, plumbing, mechanical, and structural measures) to Reduce Or Eliminate Hazards PCS 3.4 Provide Regional and State Engineering and Structural Measure Guidelines to Reduce Or Eliminate Hazards
ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (EPA/USCG/DOD)			
Provides On-Scene Coordinator and directs response actions for DOD hazardous materials	Installation Commanders	SN 3.4.4 Safeguard National Strategic Capabilities SN 3.4.10 Protect the National Sea Frontiers ST 6.2.2 Coordinate the Removal of Strategically Significant Hazards OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery and Salvage OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally Significant Hazards OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA	IM 10 Coordinate Oil and Hazardous Materials Response IPR 10 Conduct Oil and Hazardous Materials Response NS 5.9 Provide Oil and HAZMAT Response Support for Incident of National Significance PCS 5.11 Coordinate Oil and HAZMAT Response Support for Response of National, Regional and State Significance (See PCS 5.11.1) IPR 10.1 Implement Plans, Programs, Agreements and Requirements for Responding to Hazardous Material Incidents As Required
Provides response and recovery assistance to Radiological Dispersal Device and Improvised Nuclear Device incidents	USACE/ USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM/ USTRANSCOM	SN 9.2.2 Coordinate Consequence Management OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery and Salvage OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA	IM 5.4.1.11 Implement Radiological Assistance Program Plan (RAP), Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and National Response Plan (NRP) NS 5.9.8 Track, Monitor, and Secure All Production, Use, and Transfer of Nuclear Material

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Assess food supply and storage facility availability	JDOMS	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratories and Supply	PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and Agricultural Support for Response to Incident of Regional and State Significance (See PCS 5.12.1.2, PCS 5.12.6) PCS 6.1 Establish Regional, State, tribal, and Local Systems for Describing, Inventorying, Requesting, and Tracking Resources (See PCS 6.1.1.3)
Assess transportation, material handling equipment and personnel availability. NOTE: This responsibility will be confined to the posts, camps, and stations within or adjacent to the disaster area	Installation Commanders	OP 4.5.1 Provide for Movement Services in the JOA	NS 5.1 Coordinate and Provide Transportation Support (See NS 5.1.1) NS 5.10.1.2 Catalog and Locate Available Resources of Food, Transportation, Equipment, Storage, and Distribution Facilities PCS 5.12.6 Identify Requirements and Mobilize Resources Such As Transportation and Storage, Federal, State, and Local Food Stockpiles, and Staging Areas for Distribution IM 1 Coordinate Transportation Operations

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Assess laboratory and diagnostic support	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratories and Supply	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, medical health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.19) NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety and Security Support (See NS 5.12.8) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support, including mental health services (See PCS 5.9.22) PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and Agricultural Support for Response to Incident of Regional and State Significance (See SN 5.12.6.2) PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public Safety and Security Support (See PRS 5.14.7) IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory and Diagnostic Support, Subject-Matter Expertise, and Technical Assistance
Assists animal emergency response organizations	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratories and Supply	NS 5.10.2.4 Implement and Activate Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Emergency Operations Center NS 5.10.2.7 Provide Resources and Procedures for the Response to an Outbreak of a Highly Contagious Animal Disease PCS 5.12.2.7 Coordinate regional and State Resources and Procedures for the Response to an Outbreak of Highly Contagious Animal Disease IPR 11.6 Mobilize Veterinary Services for Livestock and Companion Animals

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provides veterinary support resources	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratores and Supply	NS 5.7.11 Assist in planning and Delivering Healthcare to Injured Or Abandoned Animals and performing Preventive Medicine Activities (NRP) NS 5.10.2.3 Supply Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Assets to augment VS assets in the State where the disease exists, as needed by the area veterinarian in charge (AVIC) (NRP) IM 11.6 Coordinate Veterinary Services IPR 11.6.1 Provide Veterinary Services for Livestock and Companion Animals
Provides laboratory support to APHIS	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratores and Supply	NS 5.7 Provide public Health, mental health and Medical Services Support (See NS 5.7.19) NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety and Security Support (See NS 5.12.8) PCS 5.9 Provide public Health and Medical Services Support, including mental health (See PCS 5.9.22) PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and Agricultural Support for Response to Incident of Regional and State Significance (See SN 5.12.6.2) PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public Safety and Security Support (See PRS 5.14.7) IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory and Diagnostic Support, Subject-Matter Expertise, and Technical Assistance

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provides removal and disposal assistance for contaminated and uncontaminated debris including animal remains	USNORTHCOM/ USPACOM	ST 6.2.2 Coordinate the Removal of Strategically Significant Hazards ST 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials	NS 5.3.2 Manage, monitor, and/or provide technical advice in debris management and reestablishment of ground and water routes into affected area PCS 5.4.11 Execute regional and State Contaminant Control Measures for In-Place Debris IPR 3.2.1 Conduct Clean-Up and Debris Management
ESF #12 - Energy (DOE)			
Coordinate emergency power team missions with power-system restoration	USACE	SN 8.2 -Provide DOD/ government-wide support	IPR 12.4 Provide and Coordinate the Use of Emergency Power Generation Services At Critical Facilities
ESF #13 - Public Safety and Security (DHS/DOJ)			
Provides physical and electronic security systems and expertise	USACE	SN 3.4.5 Coordinate and Conduct Strategic Operations Security	NS 2.1.7 Develop Standardized Guidelines for Physical Security Programs for government and private sector office buildings, laboratories, and other facilities IM 3.2.1 Develop Building Codes/Standards That Address Safety, Structural Integrity, and Physical Security IM 13.4.4.1 Coordinate with local emergency management and law enforcement to ensure security is provided for shelters, mass care and medical facilities

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation (DHS/USDA/DOC)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
Provides community planning and civil engineering technical assistance and natural hazard risk assessment expertise	USACE	SN 8.2 -Provide DoD/government-wide support	PCS 5.2.1 Gather and process damage assessments of regional and State transportation infrastructure IM 14 Coordinate community recovery, mitigation and economic stabilization IPR 14 Support Community Recovery, Mitigation and Economic Stabilization
Supports development of housing, debris mangagement, and restoration national strategies and infrastructure	USACE	SN 8.2 -Provide DoD/government-wide support	NS 5.2.3 Implement plans and measures necessary to identify damaged critical infrastructure assets, repair, reconstitute, and secure telecommunications networks and actions to protect these assets from secondary damage. Ensure that uniform definitions and criteria are used at and between each level of government for damage assessment NS 5.5.3 Provide assistance for mass care, short-term and long-term housing and supply needs of disaster victims IPR 6.7 Identify Long-Term Housing Needs

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)			
ESF #15 - External Communication (DHS/FEMA)			
DOD Responsibility	DOD Lead(s)	Related Universal Joint Tasks (DOD)	Related Universal Task List (DHS)
No DOD specific tasking in Aug 04 draft		SN 5.1 Operate and Manage Global Strategic Communications and Information Systems SN 3.3.6 Determine National Residual Capabilites SN 3.5.3.4 Provide Communication Channels SN 3.6.4 Maintain Communications with Other SMCC Assets and National Military Command System Command Center	IM 15 Coordinate Emergency Public information and External Communications IPR 15 Provide Emergency Public information and External Communications NS 4.1 Develop plans, procedures and policies for coordinating, managing and disseminating public information NS 5.14 Provide Emergency health and medical Public information and External Communications support PCS 4.1 Develop and provide regional and State public information PCS 516 Provide Emergency Public Information and External Communications Support for Incident of National, Regional and State Significance

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (cont'd)

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APPENDIX C

BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS

1. Purpose

The checklist below is provided to assist commanders and their staffs to conduct mission analysis, prepare to meet logistic requirements and coordinate the potential use of a military installation for base support of DOD forces during disaster response operations. These are considerations and not requirements. Depending on the physical location of the APOD and SPOD, the questions concerning airfield or port suitability may be analyzed separately or in conjunction with base support planning. BSI planning considerations should take into account, at a minimum, the following areas related to the key **functions of logistics for CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) operations**:

a. General

(1) Is there a concise concept of the purpose of the BSI? Is there a description of the functions that the BSI is to support?

(2) What forces have been identified to support the operation? Has the deployment flow been analyzed to determine time phasing for induction of logistic elements?

(3) What are the key assumptions that the BSI must operate under?

(4) For domestic CBRNE CM, where is the established JFO in the affected area? For FCM, where is the host nation emergency operation center, or where will the JTF-CM be located?

(5) For domestic CBRNE CM, where is the location(s) of the nearest FEMA mobilization site(s)? For FCM, where are the nearest APOD, SPOD, and JRSOI points?

(6) What is the anticipated time frame that the BSI will be expected to provide support?

b. For OCONUS operations the following additional considerations apply:

(1) What CBRNE capabilities are resident in the host nation or state and local jurisdictions?

(2) What mutual support agreements are in place for host nation or state/local support?

c. Airfield Suitability

(1) Is the APOD capable of handling the flow of forces and material moving in/out and around the operational area ?

(2) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the airfield capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (*Refer to JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*).

(3) Is a contingency response element needed to manage air mobility activities?

(4) What is the current condition of the airfield? What are the runway lengths? What is the current usage/throughput of the airfield? What is the working and parking maximum (aircraft) on ground?

(5) Can the airfield support MEDEVAC and utility helicopter operations?

(6) Is the weight bearing capacity of the airfield sufficient to handle the type of aircraft that will be used for movement?

(7) What impact does weather have on airfield operations? Night operations?

(8) Are adequate personnel and equipment assets available to assist in arrival/departure airfield control group operations? What materials handling equipment (MHE) is available?

(9) Is there support for mobile aeromedical staging facilities?

(10) Is sufficient refueling capability/bulk fuel available?

(11) Is direct support aircraft maintenance available?

(12) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the main supply routes (MSRs) that access the airfield?

(13) What other nearby military or civilian airfields are available?

(14) What is the threat level?

(15) What type of physical security is available at the airport?

(16) Are security personnel available?

(17) After review of threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments, what force protection measures are needed?

(18) Coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to ensure that the operative rules for the use of force/rules of engagement are properly tailored for the situation.

(19) Is air traffic control and fire/crash/rescue available?

(20) Is the airfield free of CBRN contamination? If not, is decontamination necessary? Are the contamination levels safe for current operations?

d. Supply

(1) Does the site have adequate supply support capabilities in place to sustain the forces in the operational area ?

(2) What supply capabilities are available? Will military augmentation be required?

(3) What is the process to establish requisition flow? What type of automated or nonautomated requisition system is used? How will the forces tie into that system?

(4) What supply support is available for common-user items in relation to the standard categories of supply? What type of storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety measures and procedures are in place? Is cold storage available?

(5) What distribution capability is available? What MHE is available? Can it be moved to support multiple locations to include potential forward operating bases (FOBs)?

(6) Is fuel storage and distribution available to support the rolling stock and potential FOBs?

e. Maintenance

(1) Does the site have adequate maintenance capabilities in place to sustain the units in the operational area ?

(2) What maintenance capability is available to support primarily automotive, communications, and medical equipment? Will military augmentation be required?

(3) What are the procedures for disposal of contaminated fuel, oils, antifreezes, and other hazardous materials?

(4) Is local repair part support available?

f. Transportation

(1) Can the site accommodate deployment, sustainment, and redeployment flow and facilitate movement of units in/out and around operational area?

(2) What transportation capability is available?

(3) What other transportation capabilities (rail lines or marine ports) are available to support military operations?

- (4) What transportation tracking systems are in place?
- (5) Are loading ramps available?
- (6) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the MSRs that access the base? What are the primary and secondary routes? What are the dimensions and classifications of bridges along the routes? Are there any restrictions or chokepoints? What routes are identified for evacuation?
- (7) What is the availability of installation transportation motor pool assets (truck, bus, passenger vehicles)? Are drivers available for these assets? Are rental vehicles available?
- (8) Does the installation transportation officer (ITO) have contract capability with local vendors (truck, bus, passenger vehicles) to support a surge?
- (9) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the installation capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*).
- (10) Will the ITO be able to support redeployment operations of the DOD forces?
- (11) What are the procedures and availability for ground refueling?
- (12) Who will provide transportation management services to coordinate personnel and material movements into, within, and out of the JOA?
- (13) Who will provide daily operations briefings?
- (14) Who will provide technical guidance to subordinate units and civilian agencies?
- (15) Who will coordinate and deconflict transportation movement mission assignments?
- (16) Who will monitor freight and passenger movement by all modes in the JOA?
- (17) Who will coordinate transit clearances for highway movement?
- (18) Will there be a movement control center in the JOA information clearing house?
- (19) What tracking systems will the movement control center (MCC) have access to?
- (20) Who will monitor flow and velocity in the supply distribution system?
- (21) Will a special assignment airlift mission validator be located in the MCC?

(22) Will unit movement officers back brief ITO on deployment plan?

(23) Has the unit created load plans for air movement?

g. Civil Engineering

(1) What engineering assets are in place and available to support forces in the operational area?

(2) What are the water planning factors in use on the installation? Will sufficient water support be available to support the DOD forces? What procedures are used to ensure the water is potable?

(3) What are the procedures for trash collection and disposal?

(4) What are the procedures for hazardous waste collection and disposal?

(5) What environmental rules and procedures are in place?

(6) Will the installation be able to handle the additional energy usage requirements or will supplemental generators be required?

(7) What force protection considerations will require engineer support to implement?

h. Health Services

(1) Does the site have adequate medical support capabilities in place to sustain the forces in the operational area?

(2) What medical assets are available and what capabilities do they have?

(3) Is there a primary and secondary hospital available? What number of medical field units, operating rooms, and hospital beds are available? What type and how many medical specialists are available?

(4) Are there ground and air ambulances available?

(5) Is medical supply available?

(6) Is there a pharmacy available? What types of medicine are in short supply/not generally available?

(7) What are the availability and power requirements of mobile drug/blood registration storage units?

(8) What medical capabilities exist in the local community?

(9) What type of mortuary affairs capability or plan is on site and available?

(10) Are patient decontamination capabilities available?

(11) What are the diseases endemic in the local population and vectors present in the area.

i. Other Services

(1) Is there a contracting office on the installation? What local contracting procedures are in place? What existing contracts are in place to support the major items previously listed?

(2) Is finance support available?

(3) Is there adequate infrastructure to support billeting and food service? If not, what contract lodging and food service options are available?

(4) Is there an adequate location to locate a joint operations center?

(5) Are hardstand facilities available to support several large command operations centers?

(6) What is the availability of laundry, shower, and latrine facilities? Will the installation provide portable facilities as required?

(7) Are exchange facilities available?

(8) Is there adequate infrastructure in place to support C2 communications requirements?

(9) Are there adequate force protection and security procedures in place? Will this require military augmentation?

(10) What are the procedures for receiving mail?

(11) What type of public affairs assistance is available?

(12) What type of religious support is available?

(13) Is there adequate security forces and trained security augmentation forces support to:

(a) Secure the site (mark areas around the site clearly).

(b) Provide convoy security on to the installation or from one area of the installation to another for containment of the crisis.

(c) Implement force protection tasks as assigned.

(d) Provide weapons and ammunition storage facilities.

(14) Is there a CBRNE capability resident on the installation?

(15) Is there a fire-fighting capability resident on the installation?

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APPENDIX D REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-41 is based upon the following references:

1. General

- a. The Constitution of the United States.
- b. Title 10 USC (Armed Forces).
- c. Title 14 USC (USCG).
- d. Title 32 USC (National Guard).
- e. Homeland Security Act of 2002.
- f. USA PATRIOT Act.
- g. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
- h. Title 31 USC 1535 (Economy Act).
- i. Title 18 USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act).
- j. HSPD-1, *Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council*.
- k. HSPD-3, *The Homeland Security Advisory System*.
- l. NSPD-17/HSPD-4, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- m. HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*.
- n. HSPD-8, *National Preparedness*.
- o. HSPD-9, *Defense of United States Agriculture and Food*.
- p. HSPD-10, *Biodefense for the 21st Century*.
- q. NSPD-20, *Counterproliferation Interdiction*.
- r. NSPD-46, *National Policy for Combating Terrorism*.
- s. National Response Plan.

t. Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Risk Management Series: Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings*, FEMA 426.

u. *The 9/11 Commission Report – Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States*.

v. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

w. National Security Strategy.

x. National Military Strategy.

y. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

z. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

aa. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing.

bb. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

cc. National Defense Strategy of the USA.

dd. National Counterintelligence Strategy of the US.

ee. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

2. Department of Defense

a. Unified Command Plan.

b. Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

c. Contingency Planning Guidance.

d. DODD 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism Program*.

e. DOD O-2000.12-P, *Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan*.

f. DODD 2000.15, *Support to Special Events*.

g. DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.

h. DODD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances*.

- i. DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)*.
- j. DOD 3025.1-M, *Manual for Civil Emergencies*.
- k. DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Incidents*.
- l. DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*, 7 January 1980.
- m. DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.
- n. DODI 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines*.
- o. DODI 2000.21, *Foreign Consequence Management (FCM)*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation*.
- b. CJCSI 1800.01A, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.
- c. CJCSI 2030.01A, *Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guide*.
- d. CJCSI 3110.16, *Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations*.
- e. CJCSI 3125.01, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation*.
- f. CJCSI 321401B, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.
- g. CJCSI 3431.01, *Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team (JNAIRT)*.
- h. CJCSI 3500.01B, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- i. CJCSI 3500.02C, *Joint Training Master Plan 2002 for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- j. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
- k. CJCSM 3500.03A, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

- l. *CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).*
- m. *CJCS Guide 3501, The Joint Training System – A Primer for Senior Leaders.*

4. Joint Publications

- a. *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).*
- b. *JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
- c. *JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*
- d. *JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*
- e. *JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.*
- f. *JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*
- g. *JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.*
- h. *JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.*
- i. *JP 3-13, Information Operations.*
- j. *JP 3-26, Homeland Security.*
- k. *JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*
- l. *JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*
- m. *JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.*
- n. *JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP).*
- o. *JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.*
- p. *JP 4-02, Health Service Support in Joint Operations.*
- q. *JP 4-05.1, Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up.*
- r. *JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.*

5. Multi-Service Publications

a. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.105/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.30/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.35, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments*, (FOUO).

b. FM 3-11.4/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.2, NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Protection*.

c. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3, *NBC Decontamination*.

d. FM 3-11.6/Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 105-7/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-37B, *Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries)*.

e. FM 3-11.9/MCRP 3-37.1B, Navy Tactics References Publication 3-11.32/AFTTP(I) 3-2.55, *Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds*.

f. FM 3-11.14/NTTP 3-11.28/AFTTP(I) 3-2.54/MCWP 3-37.1A, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Vulnerability Assessment*.

g. FM 3-11.19/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP(I) 3-4.44/MCWP 3-37.4, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Reconnaissance*.

h. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management*.

i. FM 3-11.22, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

j. FM 3-11.24/NTTP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 3-2.33/MCWP 3-37.5, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields*.

k. FM 3-11.86/NTTP 3-11.31/AFTTP(I) 3-2.52/MCWP 3-37.1C, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance*.

l. FM 4-02.33/Navy Medicine (NAVMED) P-5038, *Control of Communicable Diseases Manual*.

m. FM 4-0284/NAVMED P-5042/AFMAN (I) 44-156/MCRP 4-11.1C, *Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties*.

n. FM 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/NAVMED P-5041/Air Force Joint Manual (AFJMAN) 44-149, *Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries*.

o. FM 10-63/AFMAN 143-3, *Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theater of Operations*.

p. MCM-0026-02, *Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance*.

6. Army

a. USACHPPM Tech Guide 244, *The Medical NBC Battlebook*.

b. AR 381-61, *The Army Chemical Agent Safety Program*.

c. FM 3-7, *NBC Field Handbook*.

d. FM 4-02.7, *Health Services Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment*.

e. FM 4-25.11, *First Aid for Soldiers*.

f. US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, *Medical Management of Biological Casualties*.

7. Air Force

a. Air Force Handbook (AFH) 10-2502, *USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and Response Handbook*.

b. AFH 32-4014, Vol IV, *USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological Warfare (CB) Environment, CB Planning and Analysis: Volume 2*.

c. AFH 32-4014, *USAF Ability to Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)*.

d. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307, *Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations and Standards of Care Environment: Volume 4*.

e. AFMAN 32-4004, *Emergency Response Operations*.

f. AFRPD 10-26, *Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (C-CBRNE) Operations*.

g. AFRPD 32-40, *Disaster Preparedness*.

h. *Air Mobility Command Chemical-Biological Concept of Operations*.

8. Marine Corps

- a. Marine Corps Order 1510.71, *Individual Training Standards (ITS) System for NBC Defense (NBCD) Occupational Field (OCCFLD57)*.
- b. Marine Corps Skills Training Handbook: *Individual Combat Basic Tasks*.

9. Navy

- a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*.
- b. Naval Doctrine Publication 2, *Naval Intelligence*.
- c. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, *Naval Logistics*.
- d. Naval Doctrine Command, *Multinational Maritime Operations*, Executive Summary.
- e. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-20.31, *Surface Ship Survivability*.

10. International Documents

- a. Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement).
- b. Emergency Preparedness Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th Supplement).
- c. Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) Agreement.
- d. Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation.
- e. Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States and Canada Agreement.
- f. Canadian-United States (CANUS) Regional Emergency Management Agreements.
- g. Canada-United States (CANUS) Civil Assistance Plan (draft).
- h. North America Emergency Response Guidebook.

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APPENDIX E ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

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- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AFH	Air Force handbook
AFMAN	Air Force manual
AFTTP(I)	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)
AMS	aerial measuring system
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARS	acute radiation syndrome
ASD(HA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASD(HD)	Assistance Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)
ASD(ISP)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
ASD(RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)
AT	antiterrorism
BSI	base support installation
C2	command and control
CAE	command assessment element
CANUS	Canada-United States
CAP	crisis action planning
CB	chemical-biological
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRARNORTH	Commander, US Army North
CDRUSJFCOM	Commander, US Joint Forces Command
CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, US Northern Command
CDRUSPACOM	Commander, US Pacific Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, US Special Operations Command
CDRUSSOUTHCOM	Commander, US Southern Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM	Commander, US Strategic Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM	Commander, US Transportation Command
CF	Canadian forces
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CJTF	commander, joint task force
CJTF-CS	Commander, Joint Task Force – Civil Support
CJTF-NCR	Commander, Joint Task Force – National Capital Region
CM	consequence management
CMAT	consequence management advisory team
CMHT	consequence management home team
CMO	civil-military operations
CMPT	consequence management planning team
CM R&A	consequence management response and assessment
CMST	consequence management support team
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CrM	crisis management
CS	civil support
CSA	combat support agency
DCE	defense coordinating element
DCO	defense coordinating officer (DOD)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support to civil authorities
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EMP	electromagnetic pulse
EO	executive order
EOC	emergency operations center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO	emergency preparedness liaison officer
ERT-A	emergency response team – advance element
ESF	emergency support function
EXORD	execute order
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal coordinating center
FCM	foreign consequence management
FCO	federal coordinating officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEST	foreign emergency support team
FM	field manual
FOB	forward operating base
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FP	force protection
FPCON	force protection condition
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GIS	geospatial information systems
HAZMAT	hazardous material
HD	homeland defense
HE	high explosive
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
HS	homeland security
HSPD	homeland security Presidential directive
HSS	health service support
IAC	Interagency Advisory Council
ICS	incident command system
IGO	intergovernmental organization
ILOC	integrated line of communications
ITO	installation transportation officer
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
JA	judge advocate
JDOMS	Joint Director of Military Support
JFC	joint force commander
JFO	joint field office
JOA	joint operations area
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPAC	joint planning augmentation cell
JRERP	Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JTAC	joint technical augmentation cell
JTF	joint task force
JTF-AK	Joint Task Force – Alaska
JTF-CM	joint task force – consequence management
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force – Civil Support
LE	low-order explosives
LFA	lead federal agency

Glossary

MA	mortuary affairs
MACA	military assistance to civil authorities
MCC	movement control center
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MHE	materials handling equipment
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSR	main supply route
NARAC	national atmospheric release advisory capability
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVMED	Navy Medical
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NDA	national defense area
NDS	national defense strategy
NEST	nuclear emergency support team
NG	National Guard
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NMS	national military strategy
NOC	National Operations Center
NRP	National Response Plan
NSA	national security area
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Security
NSPD	national security Presidential directive
NSS	national security strategy
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OPCON	operational control
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PDD	Presidential decision directive
PFO	principal federal official
POD	port of debarkation
PSYOP	psychological operations
QSTAG	quadripartite standardization agreement
RAP	Radiological Assistance Program
RC	Reserve Component
RDD	radiological dispersal device
RFA	request for assistance

RRCC	regional response coordination center
RUF	rules for the use of force
SCO	state coordinating officer
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SJFHQ	standing joint force headquarters
SMART-AIT	special medical augmentation response – aeromedical isolation team
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SPG	Strategic Planning Guidance
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
TACON	tactical control
TF	task force
TIB	toxic industrial biological
TIC	toxic industrial chemical
TIM	toxic industrial material
TIR	toxic industrial radiological
TSC	theater security cooperation
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USACE	US Army Corps of Engineers
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAMRIID	United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCGR	United States Coast Guard Reserve
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USNR	United States Navy Reserve
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD-CST	weapons of mass destruction-civil support team

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acute radiation syndrome. An acute illness caused by irradiation of the body by a high dose of penetrating radiation in a very short period of time. Also called ARS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

base support installation. A Department of Defense service or agency installation within the United States, its territories, or possessions tasked to serve as a base for military forces engaged in either homeland defense or defense support to civil authorities operations. Provides general support logistic and administrative support to military forces. Also called BSI. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02)

biological weapon. An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02)

blister agent. A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. Also called vesicant agent. (JP 1-02)

blood agent. A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02)

chemical agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (JP 1-02)

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management. The consequence management activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives that are undertaken when directed or authorized by the President. Also called CBRNE CM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

chemical warfare. All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 1-02)

chemical weapon. Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b), above. (JP 1-02)

command assessment element. The small team of personnel sent by the United States Northern Command or United States Pacific Command to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incident site to conduct a consequence management assessment and make an evaluation of potential shortfalls in federal and state capabilities, which may become requests for Department of Defense assistance. Also called CAE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

contamination control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless (temporarily or permanently) nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

crisis management. Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02)

defense coordinating officer. The Department of Defense on-scene representative who coordinates defense support of civil authorities requirements with the federal coordinating officer, or his or her designated representative. Also called DCO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

domestic. The continental United States (including the District of Columbia), Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any political subdivision thereof. Two former trust territories, Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, also are deemed eligible assistance under the Compact of Free Association. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

electromagnetic pulse. The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02)

emergency operations center. The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An emergency operations center may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. Emergency operations centers may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, state, regional, county, city, tribal), or by some combination thereof. Also called EOC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

emergency preparedness liaison officer. A senior reserve officer who is the representative of the providing Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and a designated defense coordinating officer. Also called EPLO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

emergency support functions. A grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents of domestic emergency, disaster, or catastrophe. The emergency support functions serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to Federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility. Also called ESFs. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

federal coordinating officer. The federal officer who is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The federal coordinating officer is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector. Also called FCO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

foreign consequence management. Assistance provided by the United States Government to a host nation to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives attack or event and restore essential government services. Also called FCM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

forward operating base. An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period. Support by a main operating base will be required to provide backup support for a forward operating base. Also called FOB. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. The collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation, and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributes centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also include instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also called GI&S. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 1-02)

incapacitating agent. An agent that produces temporary physiological or mental effects, or both, which will render individuals incapable of concerted effort in the performance of their assigned duties. (JP 1-02)

incident command system. A standardized on-scene emergency management organization that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. The incident command system is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents.

The incident command system is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. The incident command system is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, or organized field-level incident management operations. Also called ICS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

incident management. All actions taken to prepare for, prevent, respond to, or recover from any event impacting lives or property. It includes pre-event, during, and post-event activities. It can be associated with attack, natural, or manmade situations involving disasters or other catastrophic occurrences. It includes military support to civil authorities, military assistance to civil authorities, military assistance during civil disturbances, and military assistance to law enforcement agencies programs under the umbrella of defense support to civil authorities. It includes both domestic and foreign support operations. It includes humanitarian aid and relief missions. Actions include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential governmental services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the incident. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

incident of national significance. An actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by and appropriate combination of Federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

industrial chemicals. Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military chemical agents. (JP 1-02)

joint field office. A temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central coordination point for federal, state, local, and tribal executives who have been vested with responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance. Also called JFO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system that provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. The system is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (JP 1-02)

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander's headquarters established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the commander's decisions. Also called JOC. (JP 1-02)

joint planning augmentation cell. An exportable planning expertise for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management operations. Also called JPAC. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. Also called JRSOI. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

Joint Task Force – Civil Support. A standing joint task force established to plan and integrate Department of Defense support to the designated lead federal agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management operations. Also called JTF-CS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint technical augmentation cell. A tailored team that, when directed, deploys to a supported combatant commander's area of responsibility to provide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear technical advice and planning assistance for executing foreign consequence management. Also called JTAC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

lead federal agency. The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according to the type of emergency and the agency's statutory authority. Also called LFA. (JP 1-02)
Note: The term "lead federal agency" is not in the National Response Plan but it is included in this document to be consistent with current Department of Defense doctrine and guidance.

mission assignment. The means by which the by Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency provides and assigns federal support upon declaration of a major disaster or emergency as defined in the Stafford Act. It orders the mobilization of immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the necessary work. Also called MA. Note: Department of Defense accepts all Federal Emergency Management Agency mission assignments as requests for assistance. These requests for assistance only become Department of Defense mission assignments once they have been vetted through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) and the Joint Director of Military Support and have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

mission-oriented protective posture. A flexible system of protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 1-02)

National Disaster Medical System. A coordinated partnership among the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs established for the purpose of responding to the needs of victims of a public health emergency. Also called NDMS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

National Incident Management System. A national crisis response system that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national special security event. Events of national significance that require greater visibility. Also called NSSE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02)

nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. (JP 1-02)

nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Environments in which there is deliberate or accidental employment, or threat of employment, of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with toxic industrial materials, including toxic industrial chemicals; or deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with radiological (radioactive) materials. (JP 1-02)

pathogen. A disease-producing microorganism. (JP 1-02)

persistency. In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02)

persistent agent. A chemical agent that, when released, remains able to cause casualties for more than 24 hours to several days or weeks. (JP 1-02)

principal federal official. The federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary's incident management responsibilities under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 for incidents of national significance. Also called PFO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary's attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

radiological accident. A loss of control over radiation or radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, or property or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding exposure limits for ionizing radiation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

radiological defense. Defensive measures taken against the radiation hazards resulting from the employment of nuclear and radiological weapons. (JP 1-02)

radiological dispersal device. A device, other than a nuclear explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury. Also called RDD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

radiological environment. Conditions found in an area resulting from the presence of a radiological hazard. (JP 1-02)

toxic industrial biological. Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: infectious waste and as biological samples (e.g., biopsies, diseases for research). Also called TIB. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)


toxic industrial chemical. Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc. Also called TIC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

toxic industrial material. Any toxic industrial material manufactured, stored, transported, or used in industrial or commercial processes. It includes toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial biologicals. Also called TIM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

toxic industrial radiological. Any radiological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: spent fuel rods, medical sources, etc. Also called TIR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-41** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

